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Daniel Markert, Individually and As Executor For the Estate of v. the Pnc Financial Services Group

February 10, 2012

DANIEL MARKERT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL MARKERT, DECEASED, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
THE PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., F/K/A/ PNC FINANCIAL CORPORATION, D/B/A PNC, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert F. Kelly, Sr. J.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is Defendant, The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc., formerly known as PNC Financial Corporation's ("Defendant"), Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.*fn1 For the reasons stated below, we will deny the Motion.

I. FACTS*fn2

Prior to his death on June 6, 2008, the Decedent was employed by the Defendant.

(Compl. ¶¶ 5, 8.) The Decedent began to participate in the Defendant's Incentives Savings Plan (hereafter, "401K") in the third quarter of 1983. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Decedent designated Plaintiffs as the beneficiaries of the 401K plan, entitling each to a one third share. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiffs, however, did not receive their shares of the 401K promptly after the Decedent's death. (Id. ¶ 13.) Rather, the Plaintiffs received their shares six months after the Decedent's death. (Id.) The Decedent also participated in the Defendant's Employee Stock Purchase Plan ("ESPP"). Plaintiffs allege that they are each entitled to a one third share of the ESPP along with any residual cash balance associated with the ESPP. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiffs requested that the Defendant transfer the shares to them individually. (Id. ¶ 19.) On or about October 17, 2008, the Defendant distributed the shares into three separate accounts maintained by the Defendant for the Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 20.)

The Decedent also participated in the Defendant's Pension Plan ("Pension"). (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant failed to make a timely and efficient distribution of the assets under the 401K, ESPP, and Pension plans (collectively, the "Plans") as they requested it to do. (Id. ¶ 28.) As a result, Plaintiffs claim that the market value of the Plans experienced a steep and significant decline. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Plaintiffs commenced this action in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. On July 14, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a six-count Complaint against the Defendant alleging state law claims for breach of contract (Count I), breach of fiduciary duty (Count II), negligence (Count III), conversion (Count IV), detrimental reliance/promissory estoppel (Count V), and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (Count VI).

On August 1, 2011, the Defendant removed the action to this Court alleging that the Plaintiffs' claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (Def.'s Not. Removal ¶¶ 1, 15-19.) On August 8, 2011, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Specifically, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by ERISA, Plaintiffs' suit was premature because they did not exhaust their administrative remedies, and Plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not suffer an "injury-in-fact" because they received the benefits. (Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 4-6.) Apparently, Plaintiffs were unable to amend their Complaint within the 21 day deadline required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 because they needed to acquire counsel familiar with ERISA practice. (Pl.'s Mot. to File Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) The Defendant agreed to extend the time to respond to its Motion to Dismiss. (Id. ¶ 6.) On September 12, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint with an attached Proposed Amended Complaint. The Proposed Amended Complaint contained only three counts: breach of fiduciary duty by the individual plaintiffs (Count I); breach of fiduciary duty by the Decedent's estate (Count II); and breach of the duty to inform (Count III). Each of the new counts were founded on ERISA's provisions and the alleged rights and duties created by the Statute. The Proposed Amended Complaint did not attempt to revive any of the state law claims. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs did not submit any other response to the arguments raised by the Defendant in its Motion to Dismiss or its brief in support thereof.

As noted, the Defendant moved to dismiss all state law claims on grounds of preemption. In "response," the Plaintiffs omitted those claims from their Proposed Amended Complaint and grounded them in ERISA's statutory scheme. Because of this omission, we found that the Plaintiffs effectively waived or abandoned all of the state claims in their First Complaint. See Markert, 2011 WL 5525347 at *5. In addition we found that "offering an amended pleading, which omits the claims that the Defendant sought to dismiss, is akin to leaving issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss uncontested." Id. We further determined that: Defendant has failed to provide adequate justification to dismiss the Plaintiffs' ESPP claims at this time. With regard to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, we find that the exhaustion requirement is inapplicable to the Plaintiffs' claims because they are alleging statutory violations of ERISA. We further find that the Plaintiffs have stated claims for which relief can be granted in Count I and Count II under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in LaRue. Furthermore, we find that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted in Count III of their Proposed Amended Complaint because they fail to allege which of ERISA's provisions contained in subchapter I relates to the disclosure of beneficiary account passwords. Finally, we will grant the Plaintiffs leave to file a further amended complaint to properly set forth their claims and to cure any deficiencies.

Id. at 13. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on November 28, 2011. (Doc. No. 13). Defendant filed the instant Motion on December 12, 2011. (Doc. No. 16). Plaintiff filed a Response on December 29, 2011, and the Defendant filed a Reply on January 24, 2012. (Doc. Nos. 17, 19).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court stated that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Following Twombly, the Third Circuit has explained that the factual allegations in the complaint may not be "so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice which is contemplated by Rule 8." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Moreover, "it is no longer sufficient to allege mere elements of a cause of action; instead 'a complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8). Furthermore, the complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Notwithstanding Twombly, the basic tenets of the Rule 12(b)(6) have not changed. The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., No. 08-4221, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30230, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2009). The general rules of pleading still require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, not detailed factual allegations. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. Moreover, when evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the plaintiff's complaint, and must view any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.; Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the ...


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