The opinion of the court was delivered by: Robert F. Kelly, Sr. J.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff, W. Graham Arader's ("Plaintiff") Motion for Reconsideration of our decision to dismiss his Complaint. Plaintiff has also filed a "Motion Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to File [an] Amended Complaint."*fn1 For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motions will be denied.*fn2
Plaintiff owns an art gallery in New York and sells rare books, photographic plates, and like items and materials on a consignment basis. (Compl. ¶ 4.) John E. Du Pont*fn4 ("Du Pont") was a billionaire and a member of the prominent Du Pont family. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant, Dimitrov, is the personal representative of Du Pont's Estate, which was probated on January 18, 2011, in the Delaware County Register of Wills. (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendants Wochok and Brady are co-trustees of Du Pont's Deed of Trust, dated April 6, 1984, as amended ("Trust") with a business address in Paoli, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 8.) Du Pont was also a co-trustee until his death. (Id. ¶ 9.) In 1996, Du Pont shot and killed Olympic gold medal wrestler Dave Schultz on his 800 acre estate in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. (Id.) In 1997, Du Pont was convicted of third degree murder and sentenced to 13-40 years in prison. (Id.) Du Pont died while incarcerated on December 9, 2010. (Id.)*fn5
Plaintiff alleges that, in the 1980's, he and Du Pont had a business relationship whereby Du Pont consigned rare books, watercolors, and plates to Plaintiff for sale at his art gallery. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that the business relationship between Du Pont and himself ended in the late 1980's. According to Plaintiff, in 2005, nine years after Du Pont was incarcerated and fifteen years after Plaintiff and Du Pont terminated their business relationship, Du Pont and Wochok contacted Plaintiff and demanded payment for the value of certain consigned goods. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff informed Du Pont and Wochok that he had either returned the consigned goods to Du Pont or had paid Du Pont for such goods prior to Du Pont's imprisonment in 1996. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff's position is that Du Pont and the Defendants demanded payment knowing that their demand was grossly untimely. (Id. ¶ 15.)
A. The State Court Action
On September 4, 2007, three individuals filed a two-count complaint against Plaintiff in Delaware County (the "Delaware County Action"): (1) Du Pont, both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as co-trustee of the Trust; (2) Wochok, in his capacity as co-trustee of the Trust; and (3) Brady in her capacity as co-trustee of the Trust (collectively, "Du Pont parties"). (Id. ¶ 18.) The Du Pont parties claimed that Plaintiff committed the tort of conversion and that he was unjustly enriched by failing to pay Du Pont for the goods. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.) Plaintiff alleges that these actions have statutes of limitations of two and four years, respectively. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that, despite the fact that the statute of limitations for both counts had well expired, he was forced to defend the Delaware County Action throughout all phases of the litigation. (Id. ¶ 23.) On August 28, 2008, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Du Pont parties' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. (Defs.'s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A at 2.) On October 24, 2008, the Honorable George A. Pagano denied the motion without opinion. On July 23, 2010, after a bench trial, before the Honorable James. F. Proud, the court entered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on the merits of the claims and on the statute of limitations issue. (Id., Ex. D at 1-2.) The Du Pont parties then appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court without first filing post-trial motions, resulting in the trial court quashing the appeal on September 28, 2010. (Compl. ¶ 25.) The trial court granted the Du Pont parties leave to file untimely post-trial motions, including a motion for reconsideration on the statute of limitations issue, but then denied them. (Id. ¶ 26; Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E at 2.)
The Du Pont parties then appealed the court's denial of their motion for reconsideration on the statute of limitations issue. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. E at 2-3.) On January 28, 2011, the court issued an opinion holding that both counts in the Complaint were time-barred because the last contact between the parties was found to have been in 1986. (Id.) Accordingly, the court opined that the Du Pont parties were required to bring their claim for conversion by 1988 and their claim for unjust enrichment by 1990. (Id. at 3.) On March 18, 2011, the Du Pont parties voluntarily discontinued their Superior Court appeal. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges, here, that, between 2007 and 2011, he was forced to expend $46,221.67 in fees and costs to defend the action brought against him in Delaware County. (Id. ¶ 38.)
B. The Federal Court Action
On June 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed the subject Complaint comprised of a
single count for wrongful use of civil proceedings.*fn6
Therein, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants wrongfully
instituted civil proceedings against him in the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas knowing that the statute of limitations had expired.
On August 5, 2011, the Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim as a matter of law because
there were genuine factual and legal questions relating to when the
business relationship between Du Pont and Arader terminated. The
Defendants argued that Plaintiff's claim failed as a matter of law
because he could not prove that the primary purpose for which the
proceedings were brought was not that of securing the proper
discovery, joinder of the parties or adjudication of the claim on
which the proceedings were based. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Br. at 6.)
On the other hand, Plaintiff argued that his business relationship with Du Pont terminated in the 1980's and that the law is clear that the statute of limitations for conversion and unjust enrichment began to run at the time Plaintiff received the goods in 1986. Moreover, Plaintiff argued that improper purpose may be inferred from a lack of "probable cause." Finally, Plaintiff argued that the state court's denial of his summary judgment motion is not conclusive evidence that the suit was supported by probable cause.
In our prior Memorandum Opinion, we rejected Defendants' argument that the state court's denial of Arader's summary judgment motion in that court preclusively established that they had probable cause to bring their conversion action. Arader, 2011 WL 4807924, at *9-11. However, in granting the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, we determined that, under 42 Pa. C.S. § 8354, the Defendants had "probable cause" to believe that their conversion claim in the state court might be upheld as having been filed within the statute of limitations. Id. at 14-17. In addition, we found that Plaintiff's Dragonetti Act claim also failed because he failed to sufficiently allege an improper purpose. Id. at 17-18.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the present Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff argues that we erred in two ways. First, Plaintiff asserts that Pennsylvania's "gist of the action" doctrine barred the Defendants from bringing an action for conversion against him in state court. See Werwinski
v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 681 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying Pennsylvania law) (gist of the action doctrine bars plaintiffs from bringing tort claims that merely replicates claim for breach of an underlying contract). Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants contended in state court that Du Pont had an oral consignment agreement, i.e., a contract, with him, but that the "gist of the action" doctrine prohibits parties from relabeling an action for breach of contract as a tort claim for conversion. (Pl.'s Mot. Recons. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asserts further that this doctrine had been in effect long before the Defendants' action against him so that the Defendants' claim of conversion against him was frivolous ab initio. (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff argues that "even if a conversion action was permissible under the gist of the action doctrine, the allegations in the complaint, accepted as true, defeat the Court's contention that the Du Pont parties reasonably believed that the statute of limitations began to run in 2005." (Id. at 6.) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that "construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint demonstrates that the lawsuit was for an improper purpose." (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion to Amend the Complaint on November 4, 2011. Plaintiff asserts that "multiple Third Circuit decisions require district courts to notify the plaintiff prior to dismissing an original complaint that he has the opportunity to amend his complaint, whether or not he himself requests leave to amend." See, e.g., Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff asserts that we did not provide such notice or afford him the opportunity to amend before entering our dismissal order, and for this reason alone, we should grant Plaintiff leave to file the amended Complaint that he has attached to this Motion. (Pl.'s Mot. to Amend at 1.) Plaintiff further argues that even if Phillips does not apply, the Court must review this timely Rule 59(e) motion to amend under the liberal standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that this Motion ...