The opinion of the court was delivered by: DuBOIS, J.
In this products liability action, plaintiff Kiley Wolfe alleges that Children's Motrin manufactured and marketed by defendants caused her to develop Stevens-Johnson Syndrome ("SJS") and Vanishing Bile Duct Syndrome. Presently before the Court are defendants' renewed Daubert motions to exclude or limit the testimony of four of plaintiff's proposed expert witnesses.*fn1 For the reasons that follow, the Court denies one of defendants' motions. The three remaining motions are granted in part and denied in part.
By Memorandum and Order of March 30, 2011, the Court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's failure-to-warn and punitive-damages claims. Wolfe v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Pa. 2011). The Court granted the motion in all other respects. Id. The factual background of the case is set forth in detail in the Memorandum of March 30, 2011, and will not be repeated in this Memorandum except as is necessary to explain the Court's rulings.
III. LEGAL STANDARD-FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702
Federal Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 702 provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The "pathmarking" Supreme Court cases interpreting Rule 702 are Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 234 (3d Cir. 2004). In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that "[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court made clear that the Daubert gatekeeping function extends beyond scientific testimony to testimony based on "technical" and "other specialized" knowledge. 526 U.S. at 141.
Under Daubert, courts must address a "trilogy of restrictions" before admitting expert testimony: qualification, reliability, and fit. Schneider ex rel. Estate of Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000). The party offering the expert must prove each of these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence. In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 663 (3d Cir. 1999). Defendants challenge only the first two: qualification and reliability. Thus, the Court does not address the issue of fit.
To qualify as an expert, "Rule 702 requires the witness to have 'specialized knowledge' regarding the area of testimony." Betterbox Commc'ns Ltd. v. BB Techs., Inc., 300 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 1998)). The Third Circuit has instructed courts to interpret the qualification requirement "liberally" and not to insist on a certain kind of degree or background when evaluating the qualifications of an expert. See Waldorf, 142 F.3d at 625. "The language of Rule 702 and the accompanying advisory committee notes make clear that various kinds of 'knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,' qualify an expert as such." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Paoli I") (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702).
Moreover, "[t]his liberal policy of admissibility extends to the substantive as well as the formal qualifications of experts." Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, "it is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers most appropriate." Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996)).
The reliability requirement of Daubert "means that the expert's opinion must be based on the 'methods and procedures of science' rather than on 'subjective belief or unsupported speculation'; the expert must have 'good grounds' for his or her belief." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Paoli II") (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590). The Supreme Court held in Kumho Tire that the Daubert test of reliability is "flexible" and "the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination." 526 U.S. at 141-42 (emphasis omitted). In determining whether the reliability requirement is met, courts examine the following factors where appropriate:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 235 (citing Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8). These factors are neither exhaustive nor applicable in every case. Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1997).
Under the Daubert reliability prong, parties "do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable." Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 744 (emphasis omitted). "The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness." Id. "As long as an expert's scientific testimony rests upon 'good grounds, based on what is known,' it should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross-examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies." Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 244 (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998)).
IV. DEFENDANTS' DAUBERT MOTIONS
The Court addresses each of defendants' renewed Daubert motions in turn.
A. Motion to Exclude Testimony Related to Dr. Manuela Neuman's "Lymphocyte Toxicity Assay"
In their first renewed Daubert motion, defendants seek to limit the causation testimony of Dr. Manuela Neuman. Dr. Neuman is an Assistant Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at the University of Toronto. She is also the CEO and director of a private firm called In Vitro Drug Safety and Biotechnology. Plaintiff proposes to have Dr. Neuman testify, based in part on her Lymphocyte Toxicity Assay ("LTA") analysis ...