The opinion of the court was delivered by: Jones, II, J.
This matter arises out of a series of incidents that occurred during the course of Plaintiff Tyrone White's employment by Defendant Planned Security Services ("PSS"), which allegedly resulted in the discriminatory termination of Mr. White. Before the Court is the unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment filed by PSS and Defendants Dino Iuliano, Carlos Brown, Ashton Jones, Rodney Jones and Mary Galgon (collectively, "Defendants"), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
On May 18, 2010, Mr. White filed a Complaint against PSS alleging that PSS unlawfully discriminated and retaliated against him because of his gender, age and race (Dkt. No. 3).*fn1 Mr. White, acting pro se, seeks relief under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et seq. ("PHRA"). On June 7, 2010, PSS filed an Answer to the Complaint (Dkt. No. 6). On June 14, 2010, Mr. White filed an Amended Complaint, providing his Notice of Right to Sue issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on April 5, 2010, and naming the additional individual Defendants listed above, as well as Ashton Jones and Carl Stoffer (Dkt. No. 13).*fn2 On September 29, 2011, Defendants filed a joint Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts of the Complaint (Dkt. No. 34 ("Defs. MSJ")). Mr. White has filed no opposition.
Mr. White, an African-American male, alleges few facts. In sum, he claims that his Caucasian PSS supervisors, Defendants Carlos Brown and Carl Stoffer, retaliated against him for "wanting to report solicitation behaviors by Carlos for constantly borrowing money and...forgetting to repay." Dkt. No. 3. Mr. White also claims that Mr. Brown told Mr. Stoffer to cancel a mediation meeting scheduled for Mr. White, and that Mr. Stoffer informed Mr. White of his termination when he appeared for his work shift on June 23, 2008. Id. Mr. White further alleges that two PSS employees named Ashley Jones and Jeanette Collier, both African-American women in their early 20s, had tardiness records at PSS but were not similarly terminated. Id. Finally, Mr. White claims that Defendant Ashton Jones was also not disciplined. Mr. White does not explain on what grounds he seems to believe Mr. Jones should have been so disciplined, or how the circumstances of the other individuals' employment are related to Mr. White's. Id.
In their Statement of Undisputed Facts (Dkt. No. 34 ("Defs. SOF")), Defendants fill in some of the gaps left open by Mr. White's brief pleadings. PSS contracts to provide safety and security services for residential and commercial facilities (Defs. SOF ¶ 12), including The Arts Condominium ("The Arts"), a residential building located at 1324 Locust Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 13. Mr. White joined PSS as a concierge at The Arts on August 6, 2006. Id. ¶ 15. While working for PSS at The Arts, Mr. White's supervisor was Defendant Carlos Brown, an African-American male who, at the time, was in his late 40s. Id. ¶ 16.*fn3
During his shifts, Mr. White would often work with Jeffrey Glencamp, an African-American male whom Mr. White identified to be in his late 40s. Id. ¶ 20. The Arts' former property Manager Mary Galgon and Mr. Brown both testified that Mr. White argued frequently with Mr. Glencamp, sometimes in front of The Arts' residents. Id. ¶ 21. Mr. Brown repeatedly warned both Mr. White and Mr. Glencamp not to argue with each other. Id. ¶ 22. Ms. Galgon and Mr. Brown both received complaints from The Arts' residents regarding Mr. White's behavior, with Mr. Brown receiving additional complaints from residents that Mr. White had refused to comply with their requests. Id. ¶ 23. Mr. White admitted at his deposition that he had a loud argument with Mr. Glencamp on June 14, 2008, subsequent to an upsetting telephone conversation with Mr. Brown; Mr. Brown also received a report in June 2008 that Mr. White had indeed instigated a loud argument with Mr. Glencamp at The Arts. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.
After receiving this report, Mr. Brown removed Mr. White from the work schedule on June 15, 2008, the date after the argument. Id. ¶ 27. Mr. Brown testified that Defendant Stoffer, a former PSS Regional Manager, offered to meet with Mr. White to discuss why he was taken off the work schedule. Id. ¶ 28. Mr. White, however, refused to meet with Mr. Stoffer. Id. As a result, Ms. Galgon, Mr. Brown and Mr. Stoffer collectively decided to terminate Mr. White's employment with PSS, effective June 28, 2011. Id. ¶ 29. At the time of Mr. White's termination, PSS employed approximately ten (10) individuals at The Arts, all of whom were African-American.
In his deposition, Mr. White testified that he was wrongfully terminated because he had perfect attendance with PSS. Id. ¶ 32. It appears from his testimony that he believes Ashley Jones and Jeannette Collier were treated more favorably than he was because they allegedly had inconsistent attendance records yet were not terminated. Id. ¶ 34. Mr. White speculated that if he had missed as many days of work as either Ms. Jones or Ms. Collier, he would have been terminated. Id. Mr. White also contended that Mr. Glencamp and his nephew, both of whom are African-American, were permitted to work the same shift and as such were treated more favorably than Mr. White, despite the fact that, according to Mr. White, Mr. Glencamp's nephew was fired by PSS. Id. ¶ 35. As for Ms. Galgon, Mr. White referred to the "respect" they have for each other and did not articulate why he named her as a Defendant in this suit. Id. ¶ 36 (quoting White Dep. at 37-38).*fn4
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, disputes must be both (1) material, meaning concerning facts that will affect the outcome of the issue under substantive law; and (2) genuine, meaning the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. An issue is genuine if the fact finder could reasonably return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party with respect to that issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
"In an employment discrimination case, the burden of persuasion on summary judgment remains unalterably with the employer as movant. The employer must persuade [the court] that, even if all of the inferences which could reasonably be drawn from the evidentiary materials of record were viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor." Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The court "does not make credibility determinations and must view facts and inferences ...