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The Arden Group, Inc. et al v. Camille O. Hoffman

November 30, 2011


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Goldberg, J.

Memorandum Opinion

The primary issue in this case pertains to whether Defendant and Cross-Plaintiff, Robert W. Schulz (hereinafter "Schulz") is entitled to reimbursement of attorneys' fees from his former employer. Schulz has raised this issue through the filing of a cross-claim against Co-Defendant, Oliver Hoffman Corporation ("OHC"),*fn1 wherein he seeks indemnification for legal fees and expenses incurred through litigation arising from a failed business venture.

Presently before the Court is Schulz's motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that resolution of this case necessarily involves factual disputes, Schulz's motion will be denied.


The pertinent facts, viewed in the light most favorable to OHC, are as follows: On or about June 19, 2009, Plaintiffs in the underlying litigation, The Arden Group, Inc. and Craig Spencer, filed suit against OHC, OHC's president, Camille Hoffman, Schulz, and several other Defendants,*fn2 alleging contractual and tort claims arising from a failed joint business venture. Schulz served as vice president of OHC at the time of the events at issue and was sued in his individual capacity (as was Hoffman).*fn3 (Notice of Removal ¶ 1; Schulz's Br. 3.)

On July 20, 2009, OHC offered all of the named Defendants, including Schulz, legal representation. OHC's counsel communicated to Schulz his belief that there was "no present conflict of interest presented by the representation of all defendants," and encouraged Schulz to seek independent counsel to evaluate the representation offered. (Defs.' Resp., Ex. C.)

On July 30, 2009, Schulz's attorney advised OHC that Schulz agreed to be represented by OHC's retained counsel. Around the same time, Schulz also requested that OHC agree to fully indemnify him for any potential judgment against him. Schulz made this request despite the fact that no employment agreement was in effect which would require OHC to provide indemnification. OHC denied Schulz's request on the ground that it had no legal obligation to indemnify Schulz in the event of an adverse judgment. (Id., Ex. B.; see id., Ex. E; Schulz's Br., Ex. K.)

On August 8, 2009, Schulz changed course and advised OHC that, absent an agreement for full indemnification, he would seek independent representation to ensure his personal interests would not be compromised. Schulz indicated that he was concerned there could be "conflicting testimony between or among the individual defendants (present and former) that [c]ould have the [e]ffect of shifting potential liability between or among them." (Defs.' Resp., Ex. E.)

On December 29, 2010, Plaintiffs and OHC, Hoffman, and the Stonehill Defendants filed a stipulation of settlement of all claims. Pursuant to that stipulation, Plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal of the action against all Defendants, including Schulz. Neither Schulz nor his personal attorney participated in the settlement negotiations and Schulz did not contribute to the settlement. (Schulz's Br. 5-6; Defs.' Resp., Ex. F.)

On February 25, 2011, Schulz filed the instant motion for summary judgment on his indemnity claim. Oral argument on this motion was held on November 29, 2011.


A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The essential inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement as to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After the moving party has met its initial burden, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut the moving party's claim by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" showing a genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must refer to specific facts in the record rather than "rely[ing] on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions." Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)).

At the summary judgment stage, the court's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. In doing so, a district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to ...

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