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Mark E. Waters v. Pnc Financial Services Group

October 20, 2011

MARK E. WATERS,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. AND GAIL D. DAMPMAN DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. John E. Jones III

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is the Amended Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of Magistrate Judge Mildred E. Methvin filed on August 9, 2011 (Doc. 34), that recommends we grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) in its entirety and dismiss the Plaintiff's complaint. Objections to the R&R were filed by Plaintiff Mark E. Waters ("Plaintiff" or "Waters") on August 21, 2011 (Doc. 35). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for our review.

For the reasons that follow, the R&R shall be adopted in its entirety, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment shall be granted, and this case shall be closed.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Objection to Magistrate Judge's R&R

When objections are filed to the report of a magistrate judge, the district court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. Id. Although the standard of review is de novo, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) permits whatever reliance the district court, in the exercise of sound discretion, chooses to place on a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674-75; see also Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant meets this burden by pointing to an absence of evidence supporting an essential element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325. Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). An issue is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not rely merely on allegations of denials in its own pleadings; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985). However, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non- moving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).

Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences that a factfinder could draw from them. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). Still, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; there must be a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.

II. DISCUSSION

On July 8, 2010 Plaintiff, a former business banker employed by PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. ("PNC"), filed this action against Defendants PNC and Gail D. Dampman ("Dampman"), an employee relations investigator also employed by PNC.The three-count complaint includes allegations of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951-963, and disparate treatment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff is African-American.

The facts that form the basis of this action are essentially undisputed. Because Magistrate Judge Methvin undertook a painstaking recitation of the undisputed facts within her R&R, we shall not endeavor to recite them herein but instead shall refer the reader to pages 3 to 6 of the R&R for that summary. In short, the Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated from his position of employment with PNC based upon his race.The Defendants contend that there is no evidence that the termination was racially motivated, but that the termination was the result of ...


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