The opinion of the court was delivered by: McVerry, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Pending before the Court is the MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT, with brief in support (Document Nos. 6 and 7), filed by Defendant, Pressley Ridge Foundation, the MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO PRESSLEY RIDGE FOUNDATION‟S MOTION TO DISMISS filed by Plaintiff, Susan Patroski (Document No. 13), and the REPLY BRIEF filed by Defendant, Pressley Ridge Foundation (Document No. 18). The matters have been thoroughly briefed and are ripe for disposition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action by the filing of an eleven (11) count Complaint against Defendants, under both federal and state law, all of which relate to alleged sexual harassment and retaliation. The only claim alleged against Defendant Pressley Ridge Foundation ("the Foundation") is the last claim of the Complaint for alleged "piercing the corporate veil" set forth in Count 11. This claim does not in fact plead a separate cause of action or theory of relief, but rather seeks generally to pierce the corporate veil of Defendant Pressley Ridge to assess liability against the Foundation for the allegedly wrongful acts of Pressley Ridge and B. Scott Finnell as pled in the preceding counts of the Complaint.
The Foundation argues that Count 11 should be dismissed with prejudice because "piercing the corporate veil" is not an independent cause of action. In the alternative, the Foundation argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would allow a court to pierce the corporate veil, and thus, Plaintiff‟s attempt to bring the Foundation into this action is fatally deficient as a matter of law.
Not surprisingly, Plaintiff contends that the arguments of the Foundation lack merit and should be denied. However, in the alternative, Plaintiff requests that should the Court conclude that the veil piercing claim is not sufficiently pled, that she be granted leave to amend.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiently of the complaint filed by Plaintiff. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the "grounds‟ of his "entitle[ment] to relief‟ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alterations in original).
The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. However, as the Supreme Court made clear in Twombly, the "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. The United States Supreme Court has subsequently broadened the scope of this requirement, stating that only a complaint that states a plausibleclaim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Thus, after Iqbal, a district court must conduct a two-part analysis when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the Court must separate the factual and legal elements of the claim. Id. Although the Court "must accept all of the complaint‟s well-pleaded facts as true, [it] may disregard any legal conclusions." Id. at 210-11. Second, the Court "must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief.‟ In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff‟s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show‟ such an entitlement with its facts." Id. at 211 (citing Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1949). The determination for "plausibility" will be ""a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.‟" Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
As a result, "pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss." Id. at 211. That is, "all civil complaints must now set out "sufficient factual matter‟ to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‟" Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948).
However, nothing in Twombly or Iqbal changed the other pleading standards for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 must still be met. See Phillips v. Co. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief, and "contemplates the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in support of the claim presented and does not authorize a pleader‟s bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court did not abolish the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) requirement that "the facts must be taken as true and a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on those merits." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553).
The first issue the Court must decide is whether piercing the corporate veil is recognized as an independent cause of action under Pennsylvania law. In support of its motion that piercing the corporate veil is not recognized as an independent cause of action in Pennsylvania, the Foundation relies heavily on two cases, Village of Camelback Prop. Owners Assn. v. Carr, 538 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 1988) and Siematic Mobelwerker GmbH & Co. KG v. Siematic Corp., 643 F. Supp.2d 675 (E.D. Pa. 2009). The Court finds the Foundation‟s reliance on these two cases is misplaced. First, as Plaintiff correctly notes, in each of these cases, the plaintiff had included a cause of action to pierce the corporate veil. In Camelback, the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied a defendant‟s motion to dismiss the veil-piercing cause of action. In Siematic Mobelwerker, the court denied summary judgment finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the defendant‟s corporate veil should be pierced.
In the introductory comments to its opinion, the panel in Camelback noted that "the last count [of the complaint] does not in fact plead a separate cause of action or theory of relief at all, but rather seeks generally to pierce the corporate veil of the various corporate defendants to assess liability against Carr individually for the allegedly wrongful acts of those corporate defendants pled in the preceding counts." Village at Camelback v. Carr, 538 A.2d at 532. However, the court then proceeded to analyze the facts of the case and applicable law ...