The opinion of the court was delivered by: McLaughlin, J.
The plaintiff brought this action against Sergeant Seth Reigel in his individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her constitutional rights and asserting state-law claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, invasion of privacy, and violations of due process under the Pennsylvania Constitution. She also asserted that the Borough of Birdsboro ("Birdsboro") was liable as a municipality for failure to train and supervise its police officers and under a theory of supervisory liability.
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims are time-barred; that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for false arrest; that in the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, the claims against Birdsboro must fail; that Reigel is entitled to qualified immunity; that the plaintiffs state-law allegations are time-barred and fail to state a claim; and that the plaintiff's claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution are not recognizable under state law.
The plaintiff was granted leave to amend her complaint, and filed an Amended Complaint adding allegations that her attorney at the criminal trial did not provide her with certain documents that she had requested. The defendants renewed their motion to dismiss. The Court will grant the defendants' motion and will dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Reigel and Birdsboro with prejudice. The Court will dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice.
Mona Arlene Bowser filed the instant action on January 27, 2011, seeking relief for alleged violations of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.*fn1 The plaintiff alleged that she was falsely arrested in violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and was also subject to malicious prosecution when she was arrested in April 2008 and charged with numerous counts of violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4905(a) (providing false alarms to agencies of public safety) and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4906(b)(1) (providing false reports to law enforcement authorities). The plaintiff asserted a Monell claim against the Borough of Birdsboro for its failure to supervise and train its police officers and a claim for supervisory liability against an unnamed individual.
The plaintiff was arrested on April 1, 2008, for making false reports to law enforcement authorities. On seven separate occasions, the Berks County Communications Center received a call from a female complainant requesting assistance at the same residence for a variety of reasons, including claims that the caller's ex-boyfriend was trying to break in and that the caller had been raped and there was a man holding a gun across from her. On each of the seven occasions, Reigel responded to the residence only to be met by the resident, Susan Lynn Morris, who informed him that she had not called 911 and that there were no issues at her home. Compl. ¶ 9.
As a result of receiving these calls, Reigel obtained the recordings of the calls in order to identify the caller. Reigel played these recordings to Ms. Morris who identified the plaintiff, a person with whom she was familiar, as the caller. Based on this identification and additional information, an arrest warrant was obtained for the plaintiff and she was arrested on April 1, 2008. On April 29, 2008, the plaintiff waived a preliminary hearing in the criminal case, and on January 30, 2009, was found not guilty on all of the charges. Compl. ¶ 8.
The plaintiff further alleges that she made numerous attempts to obtain information regarding the police department's investigation into the alleged crimes. However, her attorney did not provide the requested discovery. The plaintiff contends that she did not learn of the nature or scope of defendants' investigation until her two-day trial. Mem. in Supp. of Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. 5-7.
In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court should disregard any legal conclusions. The court must then determine whether the facts alleged are sufficient to show that the plaintiffs have a "plausible claim for relief." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. If the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, then the complaint has alleged, but it has not shown, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2008). Further, where a complaint on its face demonstrates noncompliance with the applicable statute of limitations, a motion to dismiss on that ground should be granted. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting the facial noncompliance exception to the Rule 8(c) prohibition on asserting statute-of-limitations defenses in motions to dismiss).
A. Section 1983 Claims: Statute of Limitations The statute of limitations for any claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state's limitations statute for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); see also Sameric Corp v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). In Pennsylvania, that period is two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. In civil rights cases, the statute begins to run from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of the alleged injury upon which the action is based. Sameric Corp., 142 F.3d at 599. "A plaintiff need not know each and every relevant fact of his injury or even that the injury implicates a cognizable legal claim. Rather, a claim will accrue when the plaintiff knows, or should know, enough of the critical facts of injury and causation to protect himself by seeking legal advice." Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1998). For claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under Section 1983, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run from the date when legal process is initiated against a plaintiff, i.e., "when he appeared before the examining magistrate and was bound over for trial." Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007). The plaintiff waived her right to a preliminary hearing on May 2, 2008. She did not bring this action until nine months after the two year period expired.
The fact that the criminal matter was pending until January 30, 2009, does not change the analysis. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not act as a bar to claims of false arrest and false imprisonment during the pendency of the underlying criminal matter. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Thus, the limitations period for the plaintiff's Section 1983 claims expired on May 2, 2010, before the filing of her initial complaint. The Court will therefore dismiss the plaintiff's claims under Section 1983 with prejudice because they are time-barred.
B. Section 1983 Claims: Failure to State a Claim Even if the Court were to find that the plaintiff's claims against Reigel and Birdsboro were not time-barred, the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. To prevail against a municipality under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality caused the violation of his or her constitutional rights through the implementation of a municipal policy or custom. Monell v. Dept. of Social Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To state a claim for supervisory liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must "identify specifically" the conduct of a supervisor demonstrating "deliberate indifference" to the risk that constitutional rights would be violated, and show a "close causal relationship between the identified deficiency ...