The opinion of the court was delivered by: Magistrate Judge Baxter
United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter
A.Relevant Procedural History
Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this civil action on April 19, 2010. At the time of the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff was a federal inmate incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at McKean in Bradford, Pennsylvania ("FCI-McKean"). Plaintiff complains that he received inadequate medical care and treatment after he slipped on a sidewalk and suffered a wrist fracture. [ECF No. 7].
Named as Defendants are: Francisco Quintana, former Warden at FCI-McKean; Dr. Olson, Medical Director at FCI-McKean; and Dr. Johe, a physician at St. Mary's Regional Medical Center. All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. [ECF Nos. 2, 29]. Defendants have since filed dispositive motions. [ECF Nos. 20 and 26]. Despite being given the opportunity to file an opposition brief to each of those motions (see ECF Nos. 23 and 28), Plaintiff has failed to do so.
On July 28, 2011, this Court was informed that Plaintiff was released from federal custody in December of 2010 and was thereafter deported from the United States. [ECF No. 30]. Following his deportation, Plaintiff re-entered the United States, was re-apprehended, and is currently facing criminal charges for illegal re-entry of a deported alien. [Id]. Since the time of his release from federal custody, Plaintiff has not notified this Court of his whereabouts.*fn1
Under Rule 41(b), a district court may dismiss an action sua sponte due to a plaintiff's failure to prosecute the case. See Lopez v. Cousins, 2011 WL 2489897, at *1 (3d Cir. June 23, 2011). In order for a court to determine whether dismissal of a case is appropriate, the Third Circuit has set out a six-factor balancing test which requires consideration of: 1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; 3) a history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). There is no "magic formula" for balancing the so-called Poulis factors, and not all of the six factors need to be satisfied in order to warrant dismissal. See Karpiel v. Ogg, Cordes, Murphy & Ignelzi, L.L.P., 405 Fed.Appx 592, 595 (3d Cir. 2010), citing Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) and Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). Applying the Poulis factors to the present matter, this matter should be dismissed.
a.Extent of Personal Responsibility
This first Poulis fact weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. During the pendency of any litigation, the parties are under a continuing obligation to keep the Court informed of their address. In a case filed pro se, this is solely the obligation of the plaintiff and Plaintiff was advised of this obligation by way of the Pro Se Instructions from the Clerk of Courts. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and therefore bears full responsibility for any failure in the prosecution of his claims. See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir. 2008) (a pro se plaintiff is personally responsible for the progress of his case and compliance with a court's orders.).
b. Prejudice to the Adversary
Plaintiff's continuing failure to inform this Court or his adversaries of his current address makes it impossible to determine his interest in pursuing this action, nor can this matter proceed. The inability to proceed in the normal course requires this Court to find that ...