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Marie Maciejewski v. Community Bank & Trust Company

September 23, 2011

MARIE MACIEJEWSKI, PLAINTIFF,
v.
COMMUNITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Mannion, M.J.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER*fn1

Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment on behalf of defendant Community Bank & Trust Company ("Bank"). (Doc. No. 29). For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion will be GRANTED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff was employed by the Bank at the Clifford, Pennsylvania branch location from 1980 to 2008. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶9-10). From 1991 through 2008, the plaintiff held the position of Head Teller, and allegedly performed her duties without any discipline whatsoever. Id. at ¶10. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that she never encountered any difficulty with any of the branch managers. Id. at ¶¶14-15.

On January 9, 2008, the plaintiff's employment at the Bank was terminated. Id. at ¶¶11-12. Specifically, Janice Bevacqua, the Branch Manager, allegedly told the plaintiff that she was being terminated because, on prior occasions, the Board President was forced to reprimand her. Id. However, the plaintiff alleges that this statement was "totally and completely false and fabricated." Id. at ¶12.

After her discharge, the plaintiff requested a copy of her complete personnel file. Id. at ¶13. A review of her file allegedly revealed that there was only one reference to any disciplinary activity, namely a contrived accusation of wrongdoing involving a bank customer which defendant relied upon to discharge her.*fn2 Id.

Based on the foregoing, on December 10, 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint against the defendant Bank. (Doc. No. 1). Specifically, the plaintiff claims that her discharge was in violation of the ADEA as she was fifty-seven (57) years old when her employment at the Bank was terminated. Id. Consequently, the plaintiff seeks both monetary and injunctive relief. Id. at 6.

On May 6, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a brief in support and a statement of material facts. (Doc. No.'s 29, 30, & 31). On May 23, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion for an extension of time to reply to defendant's motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 33), and, on May 24, 2011, the undersigned issued an order that extended plaintiff's time to reply until June 9, 2011, (Doc. No. 34). On June 9, 2011, the plaintiff filed a second motion for an extension of time to reply to defendant's motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 35), and, on June 13, 2011, the undersigned issued an order that extended plaintiff's time to reply until July 1, 2011, (Doc. No. 36). On June 30, 2011, the plaintiff filed a third motion for an extension of time to reply to defendant's motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 37), and, on July 1, 2011, the undersigned issued an order that extended plaintiff's time to reply until July 15, 2011, (Doc. No. 38). As of the date of this memorandum, the plaintiff has failed to file any reply to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Thus, in accordance with Local Rule 7.6, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is deemed unopposed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ericksen, 903 F. Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment stage, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations). Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party can discharge the burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).*fn3

III. UNDISPUTED STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS*fn4

In 2007, the main office of the Bank was located in Clarks Summit, Pennsylvania, and the President of the Bank was William F. Farber, Sr. At that time, the Bank had about fifteen (15) satellite branches, including a branch location in Clifford, Pennsylvania.

During 2007, it became apparent to the Bank's main office, including the Bank's President, that the Clifford Branch had numerous problems. Specifically, the Clifford branch had performance deficiencies, customer complaints and poor employee attitudes. As such, Mr. Farber found that the Bank received more ...


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