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Kurt Danysh v. Eli Lilly and Company

September 15, 2011

KURT DANYSH, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. John E. Jones III

Hon. Mildred E. Methvin

MEMORANDUM

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of Magistrate Judge Mildred E. Methvin (Doc.31), filed on July 13, 2011, which recommends that we grant the Defendant Eli Lilly and Company's ("Lilly") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) on the basis that Plaintiff's action was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff Kurt Danysh ("Plaintiff" or "Danysh") filed objections to the R&R on August 12, 2011 (Docs. 34 and 35) and Lilly filed an opposition brief thereto on September 2, 2011. (Doc. 40). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's R&R, grant Lilly's Motions for Summary Judgment, and close this case.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Review of Magistrate Judge's R&R

When objections are filed to the report of a magistrate judge, the district court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980). The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations. Id. Although the standard of review is de novo, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) permits whatever reliance the district court, in the exercise of sound discretion, chooses to place on a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674-75; see also Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant meets this burden by pointing to an absence of evidence supporting an essential element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325. Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). An issue is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving party "may not rely merely on allegations of denials in its own pleadings; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985). However, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non- moving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).

Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences that a factfinder could draw from them. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). Still, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; there must be a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.

II. BACKGROUND

Within the R&R, Magistrate Judge Methvin thoroughly recounts the undisputed facts of this matter, and neither party takes issue with her characterization of the facts within the briefing on the objections. Accordingly, in the interests of judicial economy, we shall only summarize the facts integral to our analysis and refer the reader to page 1 to 12 of the R&R for a full factual exposition.

In 1996, Danysh shot and killed his father with a stolen gun. On October 9, 1997, he pled guilty to third-degree murder and robbery in the Court of Common Pleas. He is currently serving a sentence of 22 1/2 to 60 years imprisonment. Throughout the investigation, Danysh's prosecution and subsequent collateral attack*fn1 of his conviction and sentence, Danysh ...


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