The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Nora Barry Fischer
This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("motion") filed by pro se Defendant Charles Kiger ("Defendant" or "Kiger"). (Docket No. 187). Defendant claims that his sentence should be vacated because the Court erroneously applied a two-level enhancement to his case as a result of his failure to attend the sentencing hearing on August 27, 2010. (Id.). He also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing and alleges that Government counsel engaged in prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.; Docket Nos. 189, 196). The Government has moved to dismiss Defendant‟s motion, arguing that he waived his right to file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in a plea agreement with the Government and that his claims otherwise lack merit. (Docket No. 191). Based on the following, the valid collateral attack waiver in Defendant‟s plea agreement will be enforced and, therefore, the Government‟s motion to dismiss  is GRANTED, Defendant‟s motion to vacate  is DISMISSED and his motion for the appointment of counsel  is DENIED.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 15, 2008, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Defendant and his co-defendant Ronald Monach. (Docket No. 1). The indictment charged them both with the following: three counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, for conduct occurring on or about April 10, 2002, April 11, 2002 and June 11, 2002, at counts, one, two and three, respectively; and one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, for conduct occurring on or about April 8, 2002. (Id.).
The charges were the result of the operation of a sophisticated "prime bank scheme" pursuant to which Kiger and Monach fraudulently induced victims to invest $3,000,000 in non-existent securities. See Presentence Investigation Report ("PIR") dated 5/11/09 at ¶¶ 11-39. Among other things, the Defendants claimed that the victims‟ investment in the securities was fully guaranteed and would yield above market returns in only 90 days. Id. Monach was the broker in the deal as he located the victims, met with them (and their representatives) and consummated the transactions which resulted in the initial investment by the victims. Id. For his part, Kiger fraudulently created numerous documents which they passed off to the victims as legitimate. Id. He also acted as the supposed intermediary with the banks, allegedly purchasing the securities and documentary letters of credit which guaranteed the investment although no securities actually existed and the letters of credit did not guarantee anything. Id. Instead, Kiger and Monach stole the money and used it for their own personal expenses. Id. Kiger personally received $933,000.00 of the money and forwarded another $540,000.00 to Solomon Markowitz as payment for another investment scheme. Id. at ¶ 38. Kiger used portions of his share to purchase, among other things, a $300,000.00 recreational vehicle, which was forfeited to the Government, and a second home in Florida worth over $250,000.00. Id. at ¶ 95, 98. Because Monach eventually returned $1,000,000 of the initial $3,000,000.00 investment to the victims, the parties stipulated that Kiger‟s criminal conduct caused an actual loss of $2,000,000.00 to the investors in this case.*fn1 Id at ¶¶ 35, 38.
This Court issued a Pretrial Order on June 10, 2008, scheduling jury selection and trial of the charges against Kiger and Monach to commence on November 10, 2008. (Docket No. 29). On October 14, 2008, Defendant‟s retained counsel, Patrick Thomassey, Esquire, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, citing irreconcilable differences between client and counsel. (Docket No.
33). Said motion was denied, without prejudice to re-submission upon the entry of appearance by alternative counsel for Defendant. (Docket No. 34). The Court then held a status conference upon request of Mr. Thomassey at which time he requested that a hearing be scheduled on his motion to withdraw his appearance. (Docket No. 38). A hearing was held on October 23, 2008, during which the Court heard the positions of Mr. Thomassey and Defendant regarding Mr. Thomassey‟s request to withdraw as counsel. (Docket Nos. 41, 176). During the hearing, Defendant stated that he had financial difficulties and also that he suffered from chronic pancreatitis, for which he was hospitalized for large periods of time, causing him to fail to communicate with his counsel. (Docket No. 176). The Court accepted Defendant‟s statements about his illness at that time, but admonished him to communicate with his counsel. (Id.). The Court also found that Defendant qualified for the appointment of counsel under the Criminal Justice Act ("CJA") and Mr. Thomassey, who is a member of the Court‟s CJA panel of attorneys, was appointed to represent him. (Id.). The Court further ordered that jury selection and trial be re-scheduled to commence on March 16, 2009. (Id.; see also Docket No. 45). However, the case was resolved short of trial.
To this end, on February 20, 2009, Defendant pled guilty to count four of the indictment pursuant to a written plea agreement with the Government. (Docket No. 61). In addition to Defendant‟s guilty plea to count four, the written plea agreement also provides that he "acknowledges responsibility for the conduct charged in Counts One through Three of the Indictment at Criminal No. 08-14," shall pay a special assessment to the Clerk of Court, restitution to any victims and waives former jeopardy or double jeopardy claims, post-conviction DNA testing and the preservation of evidence for same. (Docket No. 61 at ¶¶ A.2, A.9, A.13, C.2, C.3, C.4). He also agreed to waive the right to initiate post-conviction proceedings challenging his sentence. (Docket No. 61 at & A.14). Specifically, the plea agreement provides that:
Charles Kiger waives the right to take a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291 or 18 U.S.C. ' 3742, subject to the following exceptions:
(a) If the United States appeals from the sentence, Charles Kiger may take a direct appeal from the sentence.
(b) If (1) the sentence exceeds the applicable statutory limits set forth in the United States Code, or (2) the sentence unreasonably exceeds the guideline range determined by the Court under the Sentencing Guidelines, Charles Kiger may take a direct appeal from the sentence.
Charles Kiger further waives the right to file a motion to vacate sentence, under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255, attacking his conviction or sentence, and the right to file any other collateral proceeding attacking his conviction or sentence. (Id.). The plea agreement concludes, stating that "[t]his letter sets forth the full and complete terms and conditions of the agreement between Charles Kiger and the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania, and there are no other agreements, promises, terms or conditions, express or implied." (Docket No. 61 at 8). Further, Defendant asserted that "I have received this letter from my attorney, Patrick Thomassey, Esquire, have read it and discussed it with him, and I hereby accept it and acknowledge that it fully sets forth my agreement with the Office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania. I affirm that there have been no additional promises or representations made to me by any agents or officials of the United States in connection with this matter." (Id.). The agreement is executed by Charles Kiger on 2/20/09 and signed as witnessed by: Patrick Thomassey, Esquire, Counsel for Charles Kiger. (Id.).
A change-of-plea hearing was held before the undersigned on February 20, 2009. During the change-of-plea hearing, the Court directly questioned Defendant regarding the plea agreement, including whether he had: read the plea agreement; understood its contents; reviewed it with his counsel; asked his counsel any questions about the agreement and if his counsel had answered any such questions; and, affixed his signature to the final page. (Docket No. 175 at 12-14). Defendant answered affirmatively to all of the Court‟s questions. (Id.). Government counsel then read the salient terms of the plea agreement on the record, specifically stating that the Petitioner agreed to waive his right to file a motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and his right to take a direct appeal, subject to limited exceptions. (Id. at 14-18). Upon further questioning by the Court, Defendant asserted that he agreed with the terms of the plea agreement as stated. (Id. at 19). The Court then questioned the Petitioner in the following manner.
THE COURT: Mr. Kiger, do you understand that generally you or the Government would have a right to appeal any sentence that this Court could impose, but pursuant to Paragraph A14 of the letter we just reviewed, the plea agreement, you have waived some or all of your appeal rights, including the right to take a direct appeal under Title 28 United States Code Section 1291 or Title 18 United States Code Section 3742, subject to exceptions that are spelled out in the agreement. Do you understand that, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‟am.
THE COURT: Do you understand that those exceptions permit you to appeal your sentence only if, No. 1, the United States appeals your sentence; or, No. 2, if the sentence exceeds the applicable statutory limit set forth in the United States Code; or the sentence unreasonably exceeds the guideline range determined by the Court under the sentencing guidelines. Do you understand that, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‟am.
THE COURT: So to repeat, by these provisions of the agreement you are giving up your right to appeal both the validity of your plea of guilty and the legality of your sentence. Do you understand all of that, sir? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‟am.
THE COURT: Further, do you understand that pursuant to the agreement you have also waived your right to file a motion to vacate sentence under Title 28 United States Code Section 2255 attacking your conviction or sentence and the right to file any other collateral proceeding attacking your conviction or sentence. Do you understand that, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‟am.
THE COURT: Accordingly, you have [.] limited rights to appeal, if any, and I trust Mr. Thomassey has now reviewed all of that with you at this time or previously?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‟am.
THE COURT: So you understand that your rights to an appeal are limited?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma‟am.
THE COURT: You should also understand that waivers of appeal are generally permissible if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, unless a Court would determine that they work a miscarriage of justice. I have examined the record, I have observed you, I have heard your responses, and I find no basis for invalidating your waiver in this case based on your representations here in the court that you understand, that you knowingly ...