The opinion of the court was delivered by: Christopher C. Conner United States District Judge
Presently before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which Darius Manor ("petitioner" or "Manor") alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") incorrectly computed his federal sentence. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.
On January 18, 2008, petitioner was arrested by the City of Boston, Massachusetts police department on local charges and was detained. (Doc. 6-1, at 5, ¶ 6.) While in state custody, a federal detainer was lodged against him based on a petition for warrant/summons charging him with committing another crime and, thereby, violating the terms of his October 31, 2008 supervised release from a March 20, 2003 federal sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. (Doc. 6-1, at 13-14.) The January 18, 2008 arrest also resulted in petitioner being federally indicted on a charge that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). (Doc. 6-1, at 5, ¶ 7.) Thereafter, the local charges were dismissed and, on March 25, 2008, custody of petitioner was transferred to the United States Marshal's Service.
On May 14, 2008, Manor was found guilty of violating the terms of his supervised release, and he was sentenced by United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts Judge William G. Young to a term of imprisonment of twenty-four months in CR 02-10316-WGY. (Doc. 6-1, at 17.) At sentencing, Manor received credit for time served from January 19, 2008, until the date of sentencing.*fn1
(Id.) During service of this sentence, Manor was found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentenced by United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts Judge George A. O'Toole in CR 08-10089-001-GAO to a term of imprisonment of ninety-two months to "run concurrently with the sentence the defendant is currently serving. . . ." (Doc. 6-1, at 21.)
Petitioner was delivered to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons on October 28, 2009. The BOP then aggregated the two terms into one sentence computation utilizing the following rationale:
Each term of imprisonment was calculated to commence on the date of imposition. This impacts the concurrent service of both terms and creates an "overlap of the two sentences. When calculating the aggregate term, the "overlap" of the concurrent terms is added to the first sentence to establish an overall aggregate term of imprisonment. Manor's sentence computation has been calculated with an overall term in effect of 8 years 10 months and 28 days. Manor received prior custody credit from January 18, 2008, the date he was originally arrested-- up through May 13, 2008--the day prior to the imposition of his supervised release violator term. (Doc. 6-1, at 6, ¶ 10.) His projected release date, considering both earned and projected good conduct time, is October 22, 2015. (Doc. 6-1, at 31.)
A petition for writ for habeas corpus under § 2241 is the proper vehicle for relief "where the petitioner challenges the effects of events 'subsequent' to his sentence," Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1976), and where he challenges the execution of his sentence rather than its validity. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185-88 (1979); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus, petitioner has properly invoked section 2241 to challenge the determination of sentencing credit by the BOP and has done so in the proper district, where he is imprisoned. Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir.1990).
The Attorney General is responsible for computing federal sentences for all offenses committed after November 1, 1987, United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992), 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and the Attorney General has delegated this authority to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (1992). Computation of a federal sentence is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and consists of a two-step process involving a determination of the date on which the federal sentence commences and consideration of any credit to which petitioner may be entitled.
Section 3585(a) governs the commencement of service of a federal sentence and provides that a sentence commences "on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served."
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Credit for time served is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). This section provides the following:
A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to ...