In April 2009, plaintiff Harry Smith was tried, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, for various sex offenses. Compl. at 4. After a jury acquitted him on all charges, Smith brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against several officials associated with the prosecution and judicial management of his trial. This court subsequently dismissed the claims against two of those officials, Magistrate Francis Rebstock and Judge Eugene Maier. Docket No. 17. Currently pending before the court is a motion to dismiss by Katherine Lewis, a social worker with the Philadelphia Department of Human Services. Docket No. 13.
In his complaint, Smith alleges that Lewis wrote him two letters concerning allegations of child abuse. Smith claims he received the first letter on April 24, 2008, which stated that the Philadelphia Police had given the Department of Human Services a "founded report of substantial evidence of child abuse" against Smith. Compl. at 5. Smith also claims the letter advised him that "a report of child abuse may adversely affect [his] ability to obtain employment in any agency which provides care for children." Compl. at 5. Smith claims he received a second letter on May 9, 2008, from Lewis and co-defendant Felina Gustoson, which stated that the agency's investigation into Smith's case "determined substantial evidence constituting child abuse to be 'indicated'" against him. Compl. at 5. The letter also stated that Smith could notify the Public Welfare Secretary if he wished to review the agency findings. Compl. at 5.
Smith alleges that Lewis violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compl. at 5. For the reasons discussed below, the claims will be dismissed.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). In addition, pro se complaints, like plaintiff's, "must be liberally construed." Merritt v. Fogel, 349 F. App'x 742, 745 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93--96 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege entitlement to relief, but instead must "'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.
Lewis argues that Smith's claims should be dismissed because Smith sued Lewis in her "official" capacity. "Official-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55). Thus, "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Id. at 166. Moreover, in official-capacity suits, "a governmental entity is liable only when the entity itself is a 'moving force' behind the deprivation." Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). In other words, the government's "policy or custom" must have caused the constitutional violation in order for the government to be held liable under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Smith's complaint states that Lewis acted in her "official capacity" during the course of the alleged conduct. Compl. at 3, 5. But these claims must fail because Smith has not alleged any facts suggesting that a policy or custom of the government entity (the Philadelphia Department of Human Services) caused the constitutional violations. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. However, interpreting Smith's pro se complaint liberally, the court construes Smith's complaint as also seeking relief from Lewis in her personal capacity. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 ("[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right"). Accordingly, the court turns to Smith's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.
The Fifth Amendment's due process clause only applies to the federal government. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). Because Lewis is a municipal rather than federal employee, Smith's Fifth Amendment claim will be dismissed.
Lewis also argues that Smith's complaint fails to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Docket No. 13 at 7. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Although Smith's pro se complaint does not ...