The opinion of the court was delivered by: Elizabeth T. Hey United States Magistrate Judge
In this habeas corpus action, Petitioner, through counsel, submitted an ex parte motion seeking a court order to compel The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia ("CHOP") to comply with a subpoena issued by Petitioner for physical evidence and documentation pertaining to an examination performed on December 22, 2003, on a five-year old child ("A.O.") whose sexual assault gave rise to the underlying prosecution. For the reasons that follow, I will direct the Clerk's Office to file the motion and give Respondents an opportunity to respond.
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 30, 2010, Petitioner Gregory Johnson ("Petitioner") filed the present habeas motion seeking federal habeas review of his state court conviction for sexually assaulting A.O. in December 2003. See Doc. 1. Petitioner raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the most relevant for present purposes being a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce DNA evidence that would have supported Petitioner's theory of the case. See Doc. 1 at ¶ 12 Ground One. Respondents concede that the petition is timely, but that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits. See Doc. 11 at 11-18.
Petitioner raised the identical claim in his petition under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), which was heard by the same judge who presided over his bench trial. The PCRA court conducted a hearing on the question of counsel's failure to obtain DNA evidence, and obtained testimony from Petitioner's trial counsel. Of relevance to the present issue, the PCRA court reasoned as follows in denying relief:
During the PCRA hearing, trial counsel stated that his strategy was to proceed with a waiver trial. N.T. 10/18/07, p.43. Counsel believed that a jury would convict [Petitioner] based on allegations alone, and the best approach was to argue to a judge that the Commonwealth failed to prove all of the elements of the charges. N.T. 10/18/07, pp. 43, 45-46. 75, 81-85. Trial counsel stated that he discussed this strategy with [Petitioner] as well as other strategies, and that [Petitioner] agreed with the "sufficiency of the evidence" strategy.
Trial counsel stated that for strategic reasons he chose not to pursue the issue that another male's DNA was found. N.T. 10/18/07, p. 74. Trial counsel stated that he was aware that there was evidence of another male's DNA as early as August 22, 2004. N.T. 10/18/07, p. 35. However, trial counsel testified: "I wasn't sure where it would get me if I determined the DNA was somebody else's. What does that prove?" N.T. 10/18/07, p.101. Trial counsel admitted that although the DNA of another man on the vaginal swab would "absolutely" be significant to the defense, he "didn't know how it would change the testimony of the mother," as identity was never an issue in the case. N.T. 10/18/07, pp. 78, 113. Trial counsel acknowledged that this could have been one theory of a defense, but that he made a strategic decision not to put on circumstantial evidence that another male may have been abusing the child. N.T. 10/18/07, pp. 45, 70-71. For these reasons, we found that trial counsel was effective, did not fail to conduct pretrial discovery, and did not so undermine the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. * * * * . . . . As previously discussed above, the DNA evidence in this case was of no moment to the Court or to [Petitioner's] conviction. [Petitioner] was not convicted based on physical evidence and it was stipulated that there was no DNA evidence linking [Petitioner] to A.O. On May 4, 2005, during [Petitioner's] Post-Sentence Motion hearing, the [National Medical Services] DNA analysis records were admitted and indicated that no DNA from [Petitioner] was on the victim's underwear and there was partial DNA with a Y chromosome that did not belong to [Petitioner].
This evidence did not change the court's verdict. Again during the PCRA hearing, the Court stated "it did not change my view." N.T. 10/18/07, p.15. This Court reiterated that it made a credibility decision "based on both the testimony of the mother and [Petitioner]." N.T. 10/18/07, p.18. PCRA Ct. Op. 12/18/09, at 8, 14-15.
On January 7, 2011, after commencement of the present habeas action, Petitioner served a subpoena on CHOP requesting "any and all records pertaining to the treatment of A.O. on December 22, 2003 to include, but not limited to, the actual vaginal swabs taken for sexually transmitted diseases, slides or other samples, test results, and any and all documents reflecting delivery or surrender of said swabs to any other person and/or law enforcement agency." See Ex Parte Motion at ¶ 5. In response to the subpoena, CHOP provided Petitioner with a copy of A.O.'s records that did not include all of the material and documentation requested. Id. at ¶ 6. On June 17, 2011, Petitioner served a second, nearly identical subpoena on CHOP. Id. at ¶ 7.
By letter dated June 21, 2011, Petitioner submitted to chambers an "Ex Parte Motion for Order for Hospital to Comply with Subpoena for Physical Evidence and Documentation," seeking medical evidence related to the rape kit test performed by the hospital on the child victim, A.O.*fn1 As the name indicates, the motion was submitted ex parte, Respondents were not served with a copy, and the motion was neither submitted to, nor filed by, the Clerk's Office.*fn2
In making his ex parte request to the court, Petitioner relies on Rules 6 and 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases for the proposition that a court may enter orders necessary for the production of documents and evidence necessary for consideration of the issues raised in a habeas petition. See Ex Parte Motion at ¶ 9. Discovery in a habeas proceeding is governed by Rule 6, which provides that "[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery." R. Gov. § 2254 Cases 6(a). Additionally, Rule 6 provides that "[a] party requesting discovery must provide reasons for the request. The request must also include any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and must specify any requested documents." Id. R. 6(b). The Third Circuit recently addressed the issue (in a non-ex parte context) and explained that "[a] habeas petitioner may satisfy the 'good cause' standard by setting forth specific factual allegations which, if fully developed, would entitle him or her to the writ." Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 209 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). "The burden rests upon the petitioner to demonstrate that the sought-after information is pertinent and that there is good cause for its production." Id. (citing R. 6(b); Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 974 (6th Cir. 2004); Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814-15 (5th Cir. 2000)). In addition, Rule 7 provides that a "judge may direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional materials relating to the petition." R. Gov. § 2254 Cases 7(a). Rule 7 further provides that the judge "must give the party against whom the additional materials are offered an opportunity to admit or deny their correctness."
Against this limited and highly restricted backdrop of discovery in habeas proceedings, Petitioner, through counsel, has submitted an ex parte motion for discovery. Ex parte motions for discovery are not explicitly permitted by Rule 6 or Rule 7, nor are they discussed in the advisory committee notes accompanying the rules.*fn3 Petitioner has not provided any argument or caselaw supporting the propriety of the ex parte submission or for the court's ruling ...