The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sean J. McLAUGHLIN United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM JUDGMENT ORDER
Plaintiff's complaint in this civil rights action was received by the Clerk of Court on May 1, 2009 and was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter for report and recommendation in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rules 72.1.3 and 72.1.4 of the Local Rules for Magistrates.
The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, filed on May 6, 2011 , recommends that the Defendants' motion  for summary judgment be granted and that the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint  be dismissed as moot. Plaintiff's objections  were filed on May 18, 2011.
After de novo review of the complaint and documents in the case, together with the Report and Recommendation and Plaintiff's objections thereto, the Court concludes that it will adopt the Report and Recommendation in part.
Specifically, this Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation in Part II(A) that the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss  be dismissed as moot. As to the issues raised in this motion, there is no dispute or disagreement which needs to be resolved by the Court.
In addition, this Court will adopt Part II(C)(1) of the Report and Recommendation, inasmuch as the Court agrees that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact with respect to Defendant Brooks' defense that the claims against her are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, Defendant Brooks is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, I will adopt Part II(C)(2) of the Report and Recommendation based on my agreement with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of any genuine issue of fact as would establish the personal involvement of Defendants Winstead and Beard in the retaliatory acts Plaintiff claims to have suffered, rendering judgment as a matter of law appropriate as to those Defendants.
However, the Court declines to adopt Part II(C)(3) of the Report and Recommendation, inasmuch as I find that there are material issues of fact on this record concerning whether Defendants Cerami and Rogers engaged in acts of mail tampering and, if so, whether their actions were motivated by a retaliatory animus. Accordingly, the claims against Defendants Cerami and Rogers are sufficient to withstand summary judgment and Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied as to those particular claims.
As for Plaintiff's only remaining state law claim -- the Defendants'
alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress,*fn1
the Magistrate Judge concluded that there was no independent
basis for exercising federal jurisdiction over this claim, making
dismissal of the claim appropriate. Based on my conclusion that
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Cerami and Rogers will survive
summary judgment, however, I must address the Plaintiff's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress on its merits. As to this
cause of action, it is well established that only the most egregious
conduct will support liability, see Swisher v. Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228,
1231 (Pa. Super.
2005) (citing cases), and "it is for the court to determine in the
first instance whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be
regarded as so extreme and outrageous to permit recovery." Id. (citing
Johnson v. Caparelli, 625 A.2d 668, 671 (Pa. Super. 1993)).
Indeed, it has been stated that the Defendant's conduct "must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society." Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998) (quoting Buczek v. First National Bank of Mifflintown, 531 A.2d 1122, 1125 (Pa. Super. 1987)). Based on this record, Plaintiff has clearly failed to adduce facts which could satisfy this high standard. Accordingly, entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is appropriate as to this particular claim.
Based upon the foregoing, the following order is entered:
AND NOW, this 8th Day of June, 2011;
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment  be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:
1. As to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendant Brooks, said motion is GRANTED and JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of ...