Hon. John E. Jones III Hon. Malachy E. Mannion
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of Magistrate Judge Malachy E. Mannion (Doc. 11), filed on March 1, 2011, which recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4) be granted and that this case be closed. Plaintiff Zhaojin David Ke ("Plaintiff" or "Ke") filed objections to the R&R on March 11, 2011. (Doc. 12). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's R&R in its entirety.
Plaintiff, a former professor at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania ("EUP"), filed this action on February 26, 2010 against Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties ("APSCUF") a labor union of which Plaintiff was a member, and Celia Elder ("Elder"). Plaintiff claims that, throughout his employment at EUP, he was discriminated against due to his race and that APSCUF "aided and abetted" EUP'S discrimination and retaliation against him. For example, Plaintiff alleges that APSCUF failed to intervene and represent him during the tenure application process and that the union did not actively pursue Ke's grievances concerning EUP's alleged racial discrimination. Elder, who is named individually in the Plaintiff's complaint, signed letters sent to Plaintiff on behalf of the statewide Grievance Committee, informing Plaintiff of the union's decision not to arbitrate the denial of Plaintiff's tenure.
As noted above, on March 1, 2011, Magistrate Judge Mannion issued the instant R&R (Doc. 11) recommending the following with respect to the Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4):
(1) that the Motion to Dismiss be granted with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII claim against Defendant Elder because individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII;
(2) that the Motion to Dismiss be granted with respect to Plaintiff's Title VII claim against APSCUF because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations;
(3) that the Motion to Dismiss be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 1985 because they are time-barred; and
(4) that the Plaintiff's PHRA claims be dismissed because they are time-barred.
Within his objections, Plaintiff notes that he does not dispute the Magistrate Judge's rulings regarding the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims and the PHRA claim. (Doc. 12, p. 1). Thus, we shall adopt the Magistrate Judge's rulings on these claims without further analysis, since we find them to be wholly correct.
Now we shall turn our consideration to the disputed portions of the Magistrate Judge's R&R.
A. Review of Magistrate ...