The opinion of the court was delivered by: DuBOIS, J.
Before the Court are (1) applications by Chevron Corporation ("Chevron") and two of its attorneys, Rorigo Parez Pallares ("Pallares") and Ricardo Reis Veiga ("Veiga") (collectively, "the applicants"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), for the issuance of subpoenas requiring respondents Joseph C. Kohn and his law firm, Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C. ("KSG") (collectively, the "respondents"), to produce documents and appear at depositions in Philadelphia; (see Proposed Subpoena, Ex. GG to Application of Chevron Corp.; Proposed Subpoena, Ex. 26 to Application of Pallares and Veiga); and (2) a Motion for In Camera Review or Appointment of a Special Master filed by the Republic of Ecuador (the "Republic"). Intervening as interested parties are the Republic and the plaintiffs in an ongoing litigation against Chevron in Ecuador (the "Lago Agrio Plaintiffs") (collectively, the "Interested Parties"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants both the application of Chevron and that of Pallares and Veiga. The Court denies the Republic's Motion for In Camera Review or Appointment of a Special Master.
This matter arises out oflong-running litigation against Texaco and its corporate successor, Chevron Corporation, for environmental damage caused by oil drilling and exploration in the Lago Agrio region of Ecuador. The Court will address only the procedural and factual background directly relevant to the legal issues confronted. Additional background information can be found in the parties' voluminous submissions which were filed of record and in decisions issued by courts in related matters in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., In re Application of Veiga, No. 10-MC-310, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116999 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 2010); In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
A Texaco subsidiary, TexPet, began oil exploration and drilling in eastern Ecauador in 1964. In 1993, a group of Ecuadorian nationals filed a class action lawsuit against Texaco in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking damages stemming from environmental contamination allegedly caused by Texaco. Stephen Donziger and Joseph Kohn were two of the lawyers representing the Ecaudorian plaintiffs. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 524, 536, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6981 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). While this litigation, known as the "Aguinda Litigation," was pending, TexPet entered into a settlement agreement with the Republic and the Republic's state-owned oil company, Petroecuador. In this agreement TexPet agreed to perform specified environmental remediation work in exchange for a release of claims by the Government of Ecuador. In 1998, the Republic agreed that all specified remediation had been performed and the release became final. Thereafter, the Aguinda Litigation was dismissed on forum non conveniensgrounds. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The plaintiffs in that case filed a timely appeal.
In 2003, soon after the dismissal of the Aguinda Litigation was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d. Cir. 2002), Kohn and Donziger assisted a group of Ecuadorian lawyers in filing a suit in Ecuador against Chevron, into which Texaco had merged in 2001. This law suit is known as the "Lago Agrio Litigation." Both the Auginda Litigation and the Lago Agrio Litigation were financed in substantial part by Kohn and KSG, which also assisted the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs with legal and public relations strategy.
In 2005, as the Lago Agrio Litigation progressed, lawyers for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs engaged a documentary film maker, Joe Berlinger, and his crew to make a film about the litigation. The film, eventually released under the title Crude, focuses on the work of the lawyers for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs and includes footage of legal strategy meetings held by the lawyers and consultants working for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs. Some of the footage included in the film suggests improprieties on the part of Doziger and other lawyers for the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. Most notably, the film shows Doziger and other Lago Agrio plaintiffs' lawyers meeting ex parte with a supposedly neutral scientific expert, Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega ("Cabrera"), appointed by the Ecuadorian court, and discussing to discuss the details and proposed findings of his report (the "Cabrera report"). After the film's release, Chevron filed a § 1782 application in the Southern District of New York seeking an order compelling the production of unreleased footage from the filming. That request was granted in May 2010. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Subsequently, the same court ordered Donziger to provide documents and deposition testimony. In re Chevron Corp., No. 10-MC-2, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125432 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2010). Applicants base their claims in this matter in large part on materials uncovered in the § 1782 proceedings in the Southern District of New York.
Chevron alleges that the Lago Agrio plaintiffs have engaged in fraudulent and illegal behavior in their pursuit of the Lago Agrio Litigation. Chevron's allegations center primarily on the preparation of the Cabrera report, which Chevron claims was ghostwritten by U.S. environmental consultants hired by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs. Chevron and the individual applicants allege that the Cabrera report plays a substantial role in the criminal charges against the individual applicants, and that the criminal charges themselves are a product of a collusive attempt by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs and the Republic to extort an illegitimate settlement from Chevron. Chevron also alleges that the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs attempted to intimidate members of the Ecuadorian Judiciary and committed fraud with respect to other evidence and expert reports they submitted to the Ecuadorian court.
In August 2008 the Ecuadorian Prosecutor General opened a criminal investigation of Pallares and Veiga, two lawyers who signed the remediation agreement on behalf of TexPet. In April 2010 the Prosecutor General filed charges against Pallares and Veiga, accusing them of falsifying information related to the 1995-1998 settlement agreement and release between TexPet, the Republic, and PetroEcuador. The charges against Pallares and Veiga are based in part on the Cabrera report, which applicants claim was actually written by consultants for the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs despite its supposedly neutral source.
In 2009 Chevron initiated an international arbitration (the "BIT arbitration"), pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International Law ("UNCITRAL"), against the Republic. In those proceedings, Chevron attacked the Republic's filing of criminal proceedings against Pallares and Veiga and alleged violations of the American Convention on Civil Rights and the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and Ecuador. Specifically, Chevron alleged that the criminal charges against Pallares and Veiga were part of the Republic's efforts to undermine the 1995-1998 settlement agreement and release and obtain an illegitimate financial windfall from Chevron.
The applications at issue were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Granting discovery under § 1782 requires a two-step analysis. In the first step, the court determines whether the application satisfies the statutory prerequisites and whether the court has discretion to permit discovery under the statute. In the second step, the Court determines whether and how to exercise its discretion. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
A. Statutory Requirements
28 U.S.C. § 1782 provides, in pertinent part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. . . . A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). In Intel, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute as requiring the satisfaction of three elements: (1) a person's presence in the district, (2) an application from an interested person, and (3) an ongoing or contemplated foreign proceeding. 542 U.S. at 246-47, 261. If these requirements are met, the court is authorized, but not required, to permit discovery under § 1782. Id.
It is beyond dispute that Kohn and KSG are present in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (See Ex R. to Application by Chevron Corp.) Likewise, the respondents and intervening parties do not contest that Chevron and the criminal defendants, as parties in related litigation, qualify as interested persons under the statute. See Intel 546 U.S. at 256 ("No doubt litigants are included among, and may be the most common example of, the 'interested person[s]' who may invoke § 1782."). Likewise, ...