Transferred from the Southern District of Florida
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Eduardo C. Robreno, J.
This Memorandum addresses Plaintiff's Notice of Appeal (doc. no. 215) filed on December 3, 2010. The purpose of the instant Memorandum is to clarify the Court's Order of November 22, 2010, which is the subject of this appeal, pursuant to Local Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.1.
This case is part of MDL-875, the consolidated asbestos products liability multi-district litigation pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case was transferred from the Southern District of Florida to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in June 2009. The case was referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter for pretrial management and settlement conferences. At the close of discovery, in winter 2010, multiple Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which were contested by Plaintiff. On March 24, 2010, a panel of three Magistrate Judges ("the Panel"),*fn1 all of whom manage a substantial caseload of MDL-875 cases, heard oral argument on the opposed motions in the instant case, as well as three other cases transferred from the Southern District of Florida. (See doc. no. 143.) Thereafter, the Panel issued a Report and Recommendation for each individual defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Relevant to the issue currently on appeal, on June 2, 2010, Magistrate Judge Rueter issued a Report and Recommendation stating that Defendant General Electric's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied with respect to the issue of product identification; the only issue that was before the Panel. Panel members, Magistrate Judges David R. Strawbridge and Elizabeth T. Hey, joined in that Report and Recommendation. On June 16, 2010, Defendant General Electric filed Objections, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether its products were a substantial contributing factor to Plaintiff's injuries.
On October 22, 2010, the Court issued a 23-page Memorandum Opinion, adopting the Panel's Report and Recommendation, but granting summary judgment in favor of General Electric on the government contractor defense, an issue which the District Court had reserved, and which had been fully briefed by the parties. (doc. no. 202.)
On November 5, 2010, Plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion for Extension of Time, requesting an extension of the deadline to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of General Electric to November 15. (doc. no. 209.) Under Local Rule 7.1(g), Motions for Reconsideration must be filed within fourteen days of the Court's Order, placing the deadline on November 5, 2010.*fn2
On November 15, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, which was due, under Local Rule 7.1(g), on November 5. On November 22, the Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration as untimely, rendering the Motion for Extension of Time moot.
The timing for the filing of Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b). Rule 6(b)(1) provides:
(1) In General. When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time:
(A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; [. . .]
This rule "confers 'discretion' [on the Court] . . . [and] provides the mechanism by which that discretion is to be invoked and exercised." Lujan v. Natn'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 895-96 (1990). The "mechanism" is the combination of good cause, and a request. Id. at 896. It is clear from the language of the Rule that parties may not unilaterally create an extension by making a request, and that the ultimate determination lies within the discretion of the Court. See, e.g., Caraballo v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 212 F. Supp. 216, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1962)(noting that "[s]tipulations made without approval of court, purporting to extend the time . . . are ineffective.") The decision of a district court to grant or deny an extension is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and an appellate court "will not interfere with a trial court's ...