The opinion of the court was delivered by: McVerry, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently pending before the Court for disposition is the PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO STRIKE, with brief in support, filed by Defendant (Document Nos. 7 and 8), the MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION filed by Plaintiff (Document No. 14), and the REPLY BRIEF filed by Defendant (Document No. 18).
After careful consideration of the motion, the filings in support and opposition thereto, the memoranda of the parties, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the partial motion to dismiss filed by Defendant will be denied.
The following facts are taken from the Complaint. Defendant, Applied Card Systems, Inc., is in the business of selling merchant credit card payment accounts and processing services to merchants and managing the resulting portfolio of such accounts ("Portfolio Assets"). In June, 2010, the parties entered into a Letter of Intent, which set forth an agreement between the parties to explore the possibility of Defendant purchasing for $8,500,000.00 Plaintiff‟s Portfolio Assets, including the monthly revenue streams from certain unspecified credit card accounts.
Defendant was granted an exclusive period of time, specifically through July 16, 2010, within which to conduct and complete its due diligence review. Closing of the transaction was to occur on or about July 31, 2010.
The Letter of Intent also provided that Defendant "may terminate this Letter of Intent at any time by sending notice of such termination to [Plaintiff] by no later than 5:00 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time on the expiration date of the Due Diligence Period. . . . However, upon expiration of the Due Diligence Period, [Defendant] shall be obligated to close the transaction as outlined herein." According to the Complaint, eleven (11) days after the Due Diligence termination had expired, Defendant advised Plaintiff that it would not be proceeding with the purchase of the Portfolio Assets.
On August 11, 2010, Plaintiff demanded in writing that Defendant complete the transaction in accordance with the terms of the Letter of Intent. Despite such demand, Defendant has failed and refused to consummate the transaction under the Letter of Intent and has failed and refused to pay the Purchase Price to Plaintiff .
On September 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in which alleges that Defendant‟s decision not to purchase the Portfolio Assets was a breach of the Letter of the Intent. In the First Claim for Relief of the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks the equitable remedy of specific performance and requests that the Court order Defendant to complete the transaction in accordance with the terms of the Letter of Intent. In the Second Claim for Relief of the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks "[i]n the alternative, in the event that the Court finds that [Plaintiff ] is not entitled to a decree of specific performance . . . then [Plaintiff] shall be entitled to recover money damages against [Defendant] as and for [Defendant‟s] breach of the [Letter of Intent]."
Defendant requests that Plaintiff‟s equitable claim for specific performance be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. In the alternative, Defendant requests that Plaintiff‟s claim for specific performance be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint filed by Plaintiff. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[a] plaintiff‟s obligation is to provide the "grounds‟ of his "entitle[ment] to relief‟ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (alterations in original)).
The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations, and must draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. However, as the United States Supreme Court made clear in Twombly, the "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. The Supreme Court has subsequently broadened the scope of this requirement, stating that only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (emphasis added).
Thus, after Iqbal, a district court must conduct a two-part analysis when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the Court must separate the factual and legal elements of the claim. Id. Although the Court "must accept all of the complaint‟s well-pleaded facts as true, (it) may disregard any legal conclusions." Id. at 210-211. Second, the Court "must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief.‟ In other words, a complaint must do more than ...