The opinion of the court was delivered by: O'neill, J.
Plaintiff Archway Insurance Services, LLC seeks a refund of an allegedly unearned insurance premium it paid to defendant James River Insurance Company.*fn1 On September 21, 2010, I granted in part and denied in part James River's motion for summary judgment. I held as a matter of law, inter alia, that the professional liability component of the insurance policy at issue had not been cancelled and thus Archway was not entitled to a refund of the premium paid for that component. Because the evidence in the record did not allow me to determine what portion of the premium had been paid for the professional liability insurance, I ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on that issue. Presently before me are the briefs of the parties.
In 2006, Ardsley, with the assistance of its broker Archway, obtained an insurance policy from James River. That insurance policy provided both general and professional liability coverage for Ardsley's nursing home and assisted living facility. In exchange for this coverage, Ardsley paid to James River a premium of $257,100. The insurance policy itself did not, however, indicate how much of the premium was for the general liability insurance coverage and v. how much was for the professional liability insurance coverage.
Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If the movant sustains its burden, the non-movant must set forth facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A fact is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
To establish "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed," a party must:
(A) cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The adverse party must raise "more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor" in order to overcome a summary judgment motion and cannot survive by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). The "existence of disputed issues of material fact should be ascertained by resolving all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility against" the movant. Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
The question presented by James River (on which I requested briefs) is how much of the total $257,100 premium was paid for the general liability insurance. James River argues that the evidence establishes that Ardsley paid a total of $126,300 for its general liability insurance. Archway, however, moves for reconsideration of my September 21, 2010 decision that the professional liability insurance had not been cancelled.
I. Archway's Motion for Reconsideration
Archway moves for reconsideration of my decision that Ardsley's professional liability insurance coverage had not been cancelled because it did not comply with Pennsylvania's Health Care Services Malpractice Act by notifying Pennsylvania's Insurance Commissioner of its intent to cancel its ...