Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Jose A. Hernandez v. United Steel Workers Association

December 8, 2010


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Yvette Kane, Chief Judge United States District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania


(Chief Judge Kane)

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. No. 4.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's claims, though articulated as state law claims, are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). Defendant further contends that the claims as alleged are insufficient to meet the standard of a hybrid Section 301 claim and must be dismissed. Plaintiff's brief in opposition disputes both propositions. Because the complaint is not sufficiently clear and in the interest of properly exercising the Court's role as the primary guardian of the duty of fair representation, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice and order Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.


On January 11, 2007, Plaintiff Jose Hernandez obtained a position as a "back line grinder" at Dura-Bond Pipe, LLC ("Dura-Bond"). (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 3.) Upon the commencement of his employment with Dura-Bond, Plaintiff also became a member of the United Steelworkers of America.*fn1 (Id. ¶ 4.) On or about February 5, 2009, Plaintiff was terminated for failing to appear during his scheduled work hours. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that the termination was wrongful, however, because he actually was at work when his schedule so required. (Id.)

The terms of Plaintiff's employment are set out in a collective bargaining agreement, which provides a three-step grievance procedure to resolve disputes that arise between Dura-Bond and Defendant's members. (Id. ¶ 6.) The collective bargaining agreement provides that the first step of the grievance procedure is for a grievance to be filed with the foreman within three working days of the occurrence of the dispute. (Id. ¶ 7.) If the foreman's response does not adequately resolve the dispute, a grievance is then filed with the "unit griever" and "presented to the plant superintendent" for an answer to the grievance. (Id. ¶ 8.) In the event that no settlement is made upon conclusion of the second step, "representatives of the International Union and an Unit Griever and the proper executive of the company" shall consider the grievance. (Id. ¶ 9.) If a resolution is not reached by these parties, the collective bargaining agreement provides that the Union shall, at its discretion, submit the employee's grievance to an impartial arbitrator. (Id. ¶ 10.)

While Defendant did assist Plaintiff in the first three steps of the grievance procedure, it failed to advise him of the disposition of his grievance upon step three of the grievance procedure and failed to assist him in taking step four. (Id. ¶ 13.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges his grievance was not timely submitted to arbitration, his termination was finalized, and he has been unable to obtain new employment. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 21.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant's failure to aid him in the pursuit of his claims through arbitration amounts to breach of contract and a breach of fiduciary duty.


A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993), and is properly granted when, taking all factual allegations and inferences as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to show that no claim has been stated. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980). Thus, the moving party must show that Plaintiff has failed to "set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that those elements exist." Kost, 1 F.3d at 183 (citations omitted). A court, however, "need not credit a complaint's 'bald assertions' or 'legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906, 908 (3d Cir. 1997). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently held that while the 12(b)(6) standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," there must be a "'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief. . . . '[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Put otherwise, a civil complaint must "set out 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009)).


Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims, which Defendant characterizes as state law claims for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, must be deemed insufficiently pleaded LMRA Section 301 claims by virtue of complete preemption. Defendant first asserted its position that Plaintiff's claims are completely preempted by Section 301 in its notice of removal. (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2.) Plaintiff did not contest Defendant's removal by moving to remand the case, but now seems to argue, in his brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, that his claims do not fall within Section 301. Because a Court has an obligation to assure itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction prior to ruling on the merits of a case, the Court will first consider whether there is a federal question present in this case. If there is a federal question, and thus a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will then turn to Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A court has an obligation to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a pending action prior to ruling on the action, regardless of whether the issue has been adequately raised by the parties. Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (raising the subject matter jurisdiction issue sua sponte). Normally, a complaint must raise a federal question to establish federal question jurisdiction. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 109, 115-18 (1936); see also Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004). An exception to this "well-pleaded complaint" rule, however, exists in cases where Congress "so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987). Section 301 of the LMRA has been held to completely preempt the field of labor contracts such that any claim that requires interpretation of the terms of a CBA is deemed to be preempted by Section 301. Avco Corp v. Aero Lodge, I.A.M. & A.W., 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (finding that LMRA Section 301 completely preempts the field of labor contracts).

It is clear that, to the extent that Counts I and II of Plaintiff's complaint are an attempt to enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and Defendant's duties arising therefrom, the claim is completely preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) ("questions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort"). Indeed, even if Plaintiff alleged the claims were brought pursuant to the Pennsylvania law of contracts, the complete preemption doctrine requires that it be deemed a federal Section 301 claim. Id., at 210-11. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.