The opinion of the court was delivered by: Christopher C. Conner United States District Judge
Presently before the court is a motion (Doc. 308) for return of U.S. currency and property filed by defendant William Davenport ("Davenport") on June 23, 2010, a motion (Doc. 317) to dismiss and/or in the alternative for summary judgment on behalf of the United States, filed on August 20, 2010, and a motion (Doc. 324) of the United States to dismiss the motion (Doc. 308) for return of property filed on November 4, 2010. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for return of U.S. currency and property will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the motion of the United States to dismiss the motion for return of U.S. currency and property will be denied as moot.
The present motions before the court stem from the seizure of various types of Davenport's property by Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agents during the course of a criminal drug trafficking investigation. On October 28, 2008, DEA agents seized assorted jewelry valued at $26,283. (Doc. 318 Attachment 1 ¶ 4(a)). A few days later, on October 31, 2008, DEA agents seized a 2006 Mercedes Benz CLS 500 valued at $38,475. (Id. ¶ 5(a)).*fn1 The DEA made the seizures pursuant to statutory authority to seize property used and acquired as a result of a violation of the Controlled Substance Act.*fn2 See 21 U.S.C. § 881; 21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq.
In December 2008, the DEA instituted administrative forfeiture proceedings on the assorted jewelry and the 2006 Mercedes Benz. (Doc. 317 ¶ 4). The DEA directed written notice of the vehicle seizure and administrative forfeiture proceedings on December 2, 2008, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Davenport at an address known to be used by him, and to Davenport, care of his attorney, Royce Morris, Esquire, ("Attorney Morris") at Attorney Morris's address. (Doc. 318 Attachment 1 ¶¶ 5(b)-(c)). An individual accepted delivery of the notice sent to Davenport's attorney on December 4, 2010, but the notice mailed to the other address was returned December 31, 2009 with the notation "Return to Sender, Unclaimed, Unable to Forward." (Id.) The DEA published a notice of seizure of the vehicle in The Wall Street Journal, once each week for three consecutive weeks on December 15, 22, and 29, 2008. (Id. ¶ 5(d)).
On December 9, the DEA mailed written notice of the jewelry seizure by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Davenport at both a Shady Lane address-the location of the jewelry seizure-and a Pine Street address in Enola, Pennsylvania, as well as a notice to Davenport, care of Attorney Morris, at Attorney Morris's address. (Id. ¶ 4(b)-(d)).*fn3 The post office returned to the DEA the first two notices sent directly to Davenport after three failed delivery attempts. (Id. ¶ 4 (b)-(c)). The notices were stamped "Return to Sender, Unclaimed." (Id. ¶ 4 (b)-(c)). The notice sent to Davenport, care of Attorney Morris was signed for on December 11, 2008. (Id. ¶ 4(d)). Additionally, the DEA published a notice of seizure of the jewelry in The Wall Street Journal once each week for three consecutive weeks on December 22, and 29, 2008, and January 5, 2009. (Id. ¶4(f)).
On January 13, 2009, the DEA sent written notices of seizure of both the vehicle and the assorted jewelry, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Davenport at the Dauphin County Prison in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania where he was incarcerated. (Id. ¶¶ 4(g), 5(e)). An individual signed for, and accepted delivery of the notices on January 15 and 18, 2009, respectively. (Id.) The notices provided Davenport until February 17, 2009 to file a claim. (Id. ¶ 5(e)). Every notice mailed to Davenport provided information on contesting forfeiture and remission or mitigation of forfeiture. (Doc. 318 Attachment 2). On March 18, 2009, having received no claims, the DEA forfeited the jewelry and the vehicle to the United States. (Id. Attachment 1 ¶¶ 4(h), 5(f)).
Davenport filed the instant motion (Doc. 308) for return of U.S. currency and property on June 23, 2010 alleging that the DEA failed to provide written notice of the seizures within 60 days per the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i). Davenport claims that the government seized the jewelry and Mercedes Benz on October 28, and October 31, 2008 respectively, but that the DEA failed to provide written notice of the seizures until January 13, 2009, thereby exceeding the 60-day time period for notice of seizure. (Id. at 2). In response the government filed a motion (Doc. 317) to dismiss and/or in the alternative for summary judgment regarding the motion for return of currency and property alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court granted Davenport an enlargement of time to file a response to the government's motion (see Doc. 321) after which Davenport filed a document captioned as "Brief in support of motion for return of U.S. currency." (Doc. 322).*fn4
Subsequently, the government filed a motion (Doc. 324) to dismiss the motion for return of property in which the government reviewed the prior filings of both Davenport and the government related to this matter and reasserted its position.*fn5
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881, the government may seize all property, money or conveyances acquired, used or intended for use in violation of the Controlled Substance Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a); United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 669 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc). The seized property may be subject to forfeiture through administrative or judicial forfeiture proceedings. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d). Administrative forfeiture of such seized property, when valued at less than $500,000, is governed by the same process as administrative forfeiture under U.S. customs laws. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d);*fn6 19 U.S.C. § 1607. The government must send written notice to any party known to have an interest in the property, including information on applicable procedures to challenge forfeiture, and must publish notice of intent to forfeit the property once a week for three weeks. 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a).
The agency invoking administrative forfeiture must provide notice to interested parties within 60 days of seizure of the property. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i). If the government fails to send notice of seizure within 60 days, the government must return the property to the person from whom it was seized without prejudice to the right of the government to commence a forfeiture proceeding at a later date. Id. § 983(a)(1)(F). Claimants must file their claims no later than the deadline set forth in the personal notice letter, which may be no earlier than 35 days after the date the letter is mailed. See id. § 938(a)(2)(B). When the written notice letter is not received, a claim must be filed no later than 30 days after the date of final publication of notice of seizure. Id. If a claimant does not file a claim or contest the forfeiture, the seizing agency will make a declaration of forfeiture, and title to the property will vest in the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1609(a). The effect of such administrative declaration is the same as a final decree and order of forfeiture in a judicial proceeding. See id. § 1609(b); McGlory, 202 F.3d at 670.
In general, the district court lacks jurisdiction to review agency administrative forfeiture proceedings, including administrative forfeiture proceedings by the DEA. See McGlory, 202 F.3d at 670 (citing Linarez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 208, 212 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[O]nce the government initiates an administrative forfeiture proceeding and the property is not the subject of an ongoing criminal proceeding, the district court loses jurisdiction to resolve the issue of return of property.")). Nonetheless, "the federal courts have universally upheld jurisdiction to review whether an administrative forfeiture satisfied statutory and due process requirements." Id. (quoting United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d ...