The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Munley
Before the court is plaintiff/cross-defendant Shlomo Hecht's motion to dismiss Defendant BabyAge.com's counterclaim. Having been fully briefed, the matter is ripe for disposition.
This case arises out of Plaintiff Shlomo Hecht's employment with Defendant BabyAge.com ("BabyAge"). According to plaintiff's complaint, defendants retained him as Chief Technology Officer for BabyAge on May 8, 2008. (Complaint (Doc. 1) (hereinafter "Complt.") at ¶ 8). Though plaintiff had been retained as a "consultant," he received the Chief Technology Officer title. (Id.). BabyAge issued plaintiff business cards that identified him as Chief Technology Officer. (Id. at ¶ 9). The company retained plaintiff for three years, at a salary of $150,000 per year. (Id. at ¶ 10). Plaintiff wrote, rewrote and maintained BabyAge's software and fulfillment system. (Id. at ¶ 11). He remained on call twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. (Id. at ¶ 12).
Plaintiff alleges he suffered religious discrimination at work. He is Jewish. (Id. at 13). Sometime in January 2009, BabyAge's Chief Executive Officer Defendant Jack Keifer confronted plaintiff, telling him "in an angry tone" that Keifer "did not want a 'Jew Boy Club' in the office." (Id. at ¶ 14). Keifer also repeatedly "expressed negativity" about Jewish holidays and made clear to plaintiff that Keifer disapproved of plaintiff observing such holidays or taking vacation days to celebrate them. (Id. at ¶ 15). Keifer also allegedly used offensive language about Jewish people, calling them "fucking Jews" and members of a "blood sucking tribe." (Id. at ¶ 16). BabyAge's Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel, Defendant Joseph Sponholtz, likewise allegedly used such language, referring to plaintiff and other Jewish employees as "fucking Jews." Plaintiff also alleges that Keifer and other BabyAge executives schemed to eliminate all high-level Jewish employees from BabyAge, including him. (Id. at ¶ 18). He insists that Defendant Keifer told him that a certain employee had been fired "because he was a 'typical fucking Jew, that is corrupt through and through.'" (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff therefore contends that he suffered "disparate treatment" and "severe and pervasive harassment" as a result of his Jewish religion/ethnicity. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21).
Plaintiff also alleges that BabyAge breached the employment contract between the parties. On August 25, 2009, Keifer approached plaintiff and verbally informed him that his employment contract had been terminated. (Id. at ¶ 23). Plaintiff maintains that defendants terminated him because of his Jewish religion/ethnicity. (Id. at ¶ 24). BabyAge filed a civil action against plaintiff, alleging various claims during his employment with the company. (Id. at ¶ 25). These claims, plaintiff contends, served as pretext to realize defendants' goal of terminating his expensive three-year contract. (Id. at ¶ 26). Plaintiff defended himself in that lawsuit, and on December 26, 2009 BabyAge voluntarily dismissed the case. (Id. at ¶ 27). Plaintiff incurred expenses in defending this civil action, and he insists that his contract with BabyAge obligated the company to indemnify him for these expenses. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32). Plaintiff requested this compensation, but the company refused to pay. (Id. at ¶¶ 33-34).
On August 25, 2009, Defendants Sponholtz and Keifer allegedly told forty-five BabyAge employees that plaintiff had been fired because he was a thief. (Id. at ¶ 28). Defendants allegedly repeated these statements numerous times to consultants and third-party vendors with whom plaintiff had worked during his employment at BabyAge. (Id. at ¶ 29). Plaintiff insists that he had not stolen anything from BabyAge and was not a thief of any kind. (Id. at ¶ 30). Plaintiff contends that defendants' actions caused him economic harm and severe emotional distress. (Id. at ¶ 39).
Plaintiff's complaint contains five counts. Count I alleges that defendants discriminated against the defendant because of his religion in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Count II alleges a breach of plaintiff's employment contract against the defendants. Count III alleges that defendants breached their fiduciary duty to plaintiff, as an officer of the corporation, when they refused to indemnify him for the expenses incurred in the previous lawsuit. Count IV alleges defamation of character. Count V claims invasion of privacy.
Defendants then answered the complaint, and Defendant BabyAge filed a counterclaim. (See Doc. 11). Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss that action, and defendant filed an amended counterclaim. (See Docs. 14, 19). In the counterclaim, BabyAge alleges that plaintiff received access to the company's trade secrets upon being hired as a consultant, including BabyAge's "proprietary database scheme, back-end management system, and source codes." (Counterclaim (Doc. 19) at ¶60). BabyAge contends that plaintiff used this proprietary information for his own benefit and for the benefit of BabyAge competitors such as GiftBrand.com and idiapers.com. (Id. at ¶ 61). The company further contends that BabyAge took reasonable steps to protect the trade secrets by instituting polices to regulate their access and dissemination. (Id. at ¶ 62). Plaintiff had access to these trade secrets, and BabyAge alleges that he provided this information to GiftBrand.com, a company he and his wife owned. (Id. at ¶¶ 64-65). Plaintiff used BabyAge's trade secrets to benefit a competitor and damage BabyAge. (Id. at ¶ 66). Such actions, BabyAge contends, constituted a misappropriation of trade secrets and a breach of the consulting agreement. (Id. at ¶ 69). BabyAge also contends that plaintiff's actions constituted unfair competition under Pennsylvania law and violated the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 74, 81). The counterclaim also raises counts of breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty and breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss counts II, V and VI of this counterclaim. (Doc. 22). The parties then briefed the issue, bringing the case to its present posture.
Plaintiff brings this claim pursuant to the 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This court therefore has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."). The court has jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ("In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article II of the United States Constitution.").
Plaintiff/counterclaim defendant seeks to dismiss portions of the counterclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When a defendant files a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.3d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985), (quoting Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 565 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). The court may also consider "matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case." Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court does not have ...