The opinion of the court was delivered by: Eduardo C. Robreno, J.
Plaintiffs Richard Archer and Patricia Archer (collectively "Plaintiffs") commenced this action for their exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products for which the various defendants are allegedly liable. Defendant MW Custom Papers, LLC ("Defendant"), the successor in interest to named defendant The Mead Corporation ("Mead") moves for summary judgment on two grounds. First, Defendant asserts that the corporate form and Alabama's shareholder immunity defense bar Plaintiffs' claims. Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations that applies to all cases of asbestos exposure prior to May 1979. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that Richard Archer suffers from pleural mesothelioma, which was caused by exposure to asbestos or asbestos-containing products during his employment at the Cement Asbestos Products Company ("CAPCO") and National Cement facilities in Ragland, Alabama (the "Ragland Facilities"). (See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 2.) Richard Archer was employed as a machinist at CAPCO from 1964-1976 and at National Cement from 1976-2002. (See Pl.'s Mem. at 3.) Also, Patricia Archer alleges a loss of consortium due to Richard Archer's alleged exposure. (See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 2.)
Defendant is the successor in interest to Mead. (See id. at 1.) Plaintiffs' claims against Mead arise because it was a shareholder of CAPCO and National Cement from 1968 until 1974.*fn1 (See Pl.'s Mem. at 3.) At all relevant times, CAPCO and National Cement owned and operated their respective facilities where they manufactured products made from a combination of cement and asbestos. (See id. at 4.) Defendant argues that a mere ownership interest cannot give rise to products or premises liability claims, as it is shielded by the corporate form. (See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 3-5 (citing to Gilbert v. James Russell Motors, Inc., 812 So. 2d 1269, 1273 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ("corporate structure is intended to protect shareholders and officers from liability arising from the operation of the corporation")).
Defendant moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First, Defendant asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate how Mead, as a corporate shareholder of CAPCO and National Cement, is liable for their injuries. (See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 3.) Second, assuming that Mead is liable for any injuries stemming from its ownership of CAPCO and National Cement, Defendant contends that any claim is barred by the applicable Alabama statute of limitations. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiffs contend that Mead voluntarily assumed a duty of safety at the CAPCO facility and was negligent in exercising that duty. (See Pl.'s Mem. at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Mead "voluntarily asserted control over safety and industrial hygiene programs at the CAPCO facility" and that Mead's liability extends beyond the sale of its ownership interests. (Id. at 7, 9.)
This matter is before the Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. This case was originally filed in the Alabama Circuit Court in St. Clair County, Alabama. It was removed to the Northern District of Alabama and was subsequently consolidated under MDL-875 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The Court, as the MDL transferee court, will apply federal procedural law as interpreted by the Third Circuit, the circuit where the transferee court sits. See Various Plaintiffs v. Various Defendants (Oil Field Cases), 673 F. Supp. 2d 358, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Therefore, the Court will apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) as interpreted by the Third Circuit.
In applying substantive law, the transferee court must distinguish between matters of federal and state law. Where the Court has jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court will apply state substantive law as determined by the choice of law analysis required by the state in which the action was filed, in this case Alabama. See id. at 362-63 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964) (evaluating applicable law after change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)); In re Dow Sarabond ...