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United States v. Lopez

August 10, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
FELIPE JUAN LOPEZ, DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Terrence F. McVerry United States District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Now pending before the Court are counsel's MOTION TO DISMISS (Document No. 29), a pro se, handwritten MOTION TO DISMISS (Document No. 30), and counsel's AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS (Document No. 31), filed on behalf of Defendant Felipe Juan Lopez. The government has filed a response (Document No. 34) and the motions are ripe for disposition.

Factual and Procedural Background

Lopez contends that the indictment in this case must be dismissed with prejudice because it violates the Speedy Trial Act. The relevant chronology is as follows: On May 11, 2010, Lopez was arrested along with two other individuals and immediately taken into federal custody. On May 13, 2010, a criminal complaint and affidavit was filed, which charged Lopez and his co-Defendants with conspiracy, bank fraud, access device fraud, aggravated identity theft and identity theft. Defendants appeared before Magistrate Judge Cathy Bissoon, counsel was appointed, and an order of detention was entered. On June 10, 2010, the Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") was scheduled to present evidence before the Grand Jury. However, he was informed by the Grand Jury Coordinator that as a result of unexpected absences, only 15 grand jurors had appeared for service, and the panel was dismissed for lack of the required quorum of 16 grand jurors to transact business. The AUSA represents to the Court that this dismissal for lack of a quorum was a very unusual occurrence.*fn1 On June 11, 2010, the government filed an ex parte sealed motion to extend the 30-day Speedy Trial clock to enable it to present an indictment at the next scheduled sitting of the Grand Jury. On June 14, 2010, United States District Judge Ambrose granted the government's motion for extension of time. On June 15, 2010, the government presented evidence to the Grand Jury, which returned an indictment against Lopez the same day.

Legal Analysis

The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), mandates that an indictment be filed within a 30-day period from the date of arrest, as follows (emphasis added):

(b) Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.

Pursuant to § 3162(a)(1) of the Speedy Trial Act:

If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

Thus, if the indictment is not filed within the 30-day prescribed period, the Court must dismiss it -- although such dismissal may be with or without prejudice.*fn2

It is undisputed that Lopez was arrested on May 11, 2010 and was indicted on June 15, 2010, thirty-six (36) days later. Thus, the indictment appears to be untimely. However, the government makes two arguments in opposition to dismissal. First, the government contends that the Speedy Trial clock did not start on the date of Lopez's arrest, but instead began on May 13, 2010, the date that the complaint was filed. Second, the government argues that the clock should be tolled after June 10, 2010 based on the "ends of justice" exclusion in the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), due to the unexpected lack of a quorum of the grand jury.

The government cites United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 454 (6th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that the Speedy Trial clock does not begin to run until the complaint is filed. The Salgado Court, in a rather cursory analysis, concluded that a defendant is not "arrested" until formal charges have been filed. The Salgado case is non-binding in this circuit and this Court has several difficulties with its reasoning: (1) it is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the commonly-understood term "arrest"; (2) it is difficult to reconcile with the specific reference in the Speedy Trial Act to the date of arrest; (3) Congress could easily have specified that the clock begins to run on the date the criminal complaint is filed, but it did not do so; and (4) the Salgado Court's reasoning would enable the government to toll the Speedy Trial clock merely by delaying the filing of a formal complaint -- a result that is antithetical to the purpose of the statute.*fn3 In United States v. Bravo, 2004 WL 1535787 (E.D. Pa. 2004), the Court concluded that the rule in the Third Circuit is "where the primary purpose of an arrest is to detain an individual for criminal prosecution, that arrest triggers the protections of the Speedy Trial Act." Id. at *1 n.6 (citing United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464, 468-69 (3d Cir. 2003)). Similarly, in United States v. Rivera, 2002 WL 1021820 (E.D. Pa. 2002), the Court concluded that a defendant is "arrested" for the purpose of triggering the Speedy Trial Act "when the arrest constitutes a significant or continuing restraint on the defendant's liberty imposed in connection with the formal charge on which he will eventually be tried." Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (speedy trial protections triggered by the actual restraint imposed by arrest)).

In this case, there is no dispute that Lopez was taken into federal custody and deprived of his liberty on May 11, 2010 for the purpose of detaining him in connection with this prosecution. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lopez was "arrested" and the Speedy Trial clock began to run on May 11, 2010.

The initial grand jury presentation was scheduled on June 10, 2010 -- the 31st day following the date on which Lopez was arrested. Under the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act, the initial grand jury presentment, as scheduled, was untimely. The day of arrest is not excluded from the computation of time pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(a)(1)(A) because ยง 3161(b) explicitly states that the indictment must be filed "within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested." See also United States v. Webb, 201 Fed. Appx. 890, 893 (3d Cir. 2006) (non-precedential) (Speedy Trial Act clock begins to tick on the day of arrest). Even if a grand jury quorum had existed on June 10, 2010 as planned, the indictment would have been untimely. Thus, the ...


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