The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hon. John E. Jones III
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
Before the Court in this declaratory judgment action is Defendant Select Comfort Corporation ("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff John E. Boland's ("Plaintiff") claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("the Motion"). (Doc. 12). Defendant filed the Motion on April 2, 2010, and a brief in support thereof (Doc. 20) on April 16, 2010. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the Motion on May 21, 2010. (Doc. 23). Defendant then filed a reply on June 18, 2010. (Doc. 24). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition.
For the reasons that follow, the Motion shall be granted and the matter closed.
On March 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed a class action complaint ("the Complaint") against Defendant in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). The Complaint is brought "on behalf of Plaintiff individually and a class of similarly situated consumers defined herein who purchased Sleep Number(r) beds and other products from [Defendant] that were sold as new when, in fact, they were refurbished." Id. at ¶ 1. The Complaint alleges three counts: (I) violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law and substantially similar laws of other states, (II) breach of contract, and (III) unjust enrichment. Id. at ¶¶ 34-55.
Defendant filed the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on April 2, 2010. (Doc. 12).
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should consider only the allegations in the complaint, as well as "documents that are attached to or submitted with the complaint,... and any matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case." Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a). Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, "in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Accordingly, to satisfy the plausibility standard, the complaint must indicate that the defendant's liability is more than "a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 120 S.Ct. at 1949. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under the two-pronged approach articulated in Twombly and later formalized in Iqbal, a district court must first identify all factual allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded for purposes of resolving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Next, the district court must identify "the 'nub' of the... complaint -- the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]." Id. Taking these allegations as true, the district judge must then determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. See id.
However, "a complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1964-65, 1969 n.8). Rule 8 "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Id. at 234.
Plaintiff is a resident of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, who purchased a Sleep Number(r) bed from Defendant, a Minnesota-based corporation that manufactures, markets, and distributes beds and related accessories throughout the United States. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1-3). In accordance with the standard of review applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the following non-conclusory facts and ...