IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
July 22, 2010
FRANCIS COLEMAN, PETITIONER
RONNIE HOLT, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Conner
AND NOW, this 22nd day of July, 2010, upon consideration of the report (Doc. 17) of the magistrate judge, recommending that the petition (Doc. 1) for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be dismissed because petitioner Francis Coleman ("Coleman") failed to adequately exhaust his administrative remedies, and because Coleman's habeas petition is without merit, and upon further consideration of the objections (Doc. 19) to the report, wherein Coleman claims that utilizing the administrative grievance process would be futile and would result in an intentional delay of any relief, and, following an independent review of the record, it appearing that Coleman has not exhausted his administrative remedies, see Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000), and that although there is a futility exception to the exhaustion requirement, Coleman's Second Chance Act claim does not qualify as futile merely because he anticipates that internal grievance procedures would lead to an unfavorable result,*fn1 see Malvestuto v. Martinez, No. 1:09-CV-1339, 2009 WL 2876883, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2009); see also Melchiorre v. Martinez, No. 1:09-CV-1123, 2009 WL 3241678, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009) (stating that "exhaustion of administrative remedies is not rendered futile simply because a prisoner anticipates he will be unsuccessful in his administrative appeals before the twelve-month pre-release mark, which is simply a statutory maximum and not a mandate"); D'Alfonso v. Martinez, No. 1:09-CV-1033, 2009 WL 3182970, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding that petitioner had adequate time to adhere to the administrative grievance process regarding his Second Chance Act claim and that he chose not to exhaust his administrative remedies), and it further appearing that Coleman received individualized consideration consistent with the Second Chance Act, (see Doc. 10, Ex. 1, ¶ 7), see also Wires v. Bledsoe, No. 3:09-CV-2247, 2010 WL 427769, at *3-5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2010) (finding compliance with Second Chance Act when inmate received individualized consideration consistent with five factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621), and concluding that Coleman is not entitled to relief under the Act, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The report of the magistrate judge (Doc. 17) is ADOPTED.
2. The petition (Doc. 1) for habeas corpus is DISMISSED.
3. The Clerk of Court is instructed to CLOSE this case.
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER United States District Judge