Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Rooks v. Alloy Surfaces Co.

July 6, 2010

RENEE ROOKS, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ALLOY SURFACES COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANT.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Goldberg, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Defendant, Alloy Surfaces Company's, motion to dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (hereinafter "FMLA") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (hereinafter "PHRA"). Defendant also seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's common law wrongful termination claim. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Renee Rooks, filed her original complaint on February 26, 2009. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on March 30, 2009, which was denied due to Plaintiff's filing of an amended complaint on April 16, 2009. On May 6, 2009, Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement. Although the motion to dismiss was denied without addressing the merits, the motion for a more definite statement was granted, which allowed Plaintiff to amend the deficiencies in her complaint for a second time. After Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint on November 13, 2009, Defendant, for a third time, filed an identical motion to dismiss on November 25, 2009. Given Plaintiff's three (3) attempts to set forth a claim upon which relief may be granted, we will now address the merits of Defendant's motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 09-839, doc. nos. 1, 3-6, 15-17.)

Plaintiff's second amended complaint alleges that on August 23, 2006, she was injured at work and became temporarily disabled. As a result, Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim. Approximately one (1) week after the accident occurred, Plaintiff returned to work with restricted duty. On November 9, 2006, Plaintiff underwent surgery for her injuries sustained on August 23, 2006, and took leave under the FMLA. The complaint avers that after Plaintiff returned to work on January 3, 2007, she was fired on February 26, 2007, in retaliation for having filed a worker's compensation claim and taking leave under the FMLA. (Second Am. Compl., ¶¶ 9-15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded factual allegations, construe them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and "then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (reaffirming Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court may only look to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

A. FMLA Retaliation Claim

In order to state a valid claim under the FMLA, a complaint must contain "allegations that, within the meaning of the FMLA, the defendant is an 'employer' and the plaintiff employee is an 'eligible employee.'" Kaniuka v. Good Shepherd Home, No. 05-2917, 2005 WL 2994348, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 3, 2005) (quoting Reddinger v. Hosp. Cent. Servs., 4 F.Supp.2d 405, 411 (E.D.Pa. 1998)). An "employer" under the FMLA is "any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4). An "eligible employee" is someone who has been employed by the employer for at least twelve (12) months, worked at least 1,250 hours within the twelve-month period, and worked at a location where 50 or more employees are employed within 75 miles of that location. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2).

Here, Plaintiff's factual allegations only establish that she had been employed by Defendant from August 23, 2006, through February 26, 2007, which totals six (6) months. Since there are no other facts present in the second amended complaint to infer that Plaintiff was an "employee" and Defendant was an "employer" within the meaning of the statute, Plaintiff has failed to allege the threshold requirements for relief under the FMLA.

Moreover, granting leave for Plaintiff to amend the complaint for a third time would not cure the fatal flaw of lacking a causal connection between her termination and taking FMLA leave. To adequately plead a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she took FMLA leave; (2) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (3) the adverse decision was causally related to that leave. See Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir. 2004). Although Plaintiff properly alleged that she took FMLA leave and suffered an adverse employment decision, she has failed to sufficiently plead that her termination was causally related to the FMLA leave.

The Third Circuit has established that "the mere fact that adverse employment action occurs after [a protected activity] will ordinarily be insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating a causal link between the two events." Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir. 1997) (abrogated on other grounds, Burlington No. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)). "However, the court has gone on to clarify that if the timing of the alleged retaliatory action is 'unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive' a causal link will be inferred." Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, when a causal connection relies on temporal proximity alone, courts generally require that the termination occur within a few days of the protected activity. See, e.g., Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that a causal link can be inferred where only two (2) days passed between the employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action); Whitman v. Proconex, Inc., No. 08-2667, 2009 WL 141847, at *10-12 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 20, 2009) (finding that discharge within minutes of returning from FMLA leave was "unduly suggestive" of a causal link); Reinhart v. Mineral Techs. Inc., No. 05-4203, 2006 WL 4050695, at *10-11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 27, 2006) (finding that the decision to terminate an employee within twenty-four (24) hours after returning from his initial FMLA leave met "the bare minimum of sufficiency to establish causation").

Plaintiff's factual allegations, even when viewed in a favorable light, establish that she was terminated 55 days after returning from FMLA leave. Despite Plaintiff's inclusion of various conclusory statements within her complaint, there are no other alleged facts suggesting a causal connection between her FMLA leave and discharge. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to plead a sufficient FMLA retaliation claim because the temporal proximity of events is not "unusually suggestive" to infer a causal connection alone. See Garabedian v. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, No. 06-3115, 2007 WL 1795677, at *3 (E.D.Pa. June ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.