The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Munley
Before the court for disposition is the defendants' motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment directed at Plaintiff Gary Hughes' prisoner civil rights complaint. The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff is an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon on an eight to forty-four year sentence. (Doc. 1, Complaint at ¶ 7). At the times relevant to the complaint, plaintiff worked for the Prison Power House, which controlled functions for the prison such as water, heating and coal. (Id. at ¶ 9). He asserts that the prison has exposed him to asbestos containing material (hereinafter "acm"). (Id.). While a company was removing insulation from the prison, plaintiff asserts that he was exposed to the insulation, which was seven (7) percent asbestos according to lab tested samples. (Id.) The prison determined that its inmates did not meed medical assessments based on the exposure to the acm. (Id. at ¶ 11).
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants intentionally, knowingly, recklessly and/or through gross negligence, failed to maintain safe and constitutional conditions of confinement. (Id. at ¶ 15). He also alleges that defendants failed to properly train persons employed at the prison. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that defendants' action violated his rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 19). He avers that he is still in an environment that exposes him to conditions that pose a risk to his health. (Id. at ¶ 22). Plaintiff seeks the following relief: entry of judgment in his favor that his constitutional rights were violated; compensatory damages in excess of $250,000.00; and reasonable attorneys fees. (Id. at § V).
In response to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, bringing the case to its present posture.*fn1
Plaintiff brings his lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter "section 1983") for constitutional violations, thus, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 898 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986). A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing that the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must go beyond its pleadings, and designate specific facts by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
Defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (hereinafter "PLRA"). After a careful review, we agree.
The law requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to seeking relief under any federal law including 42 U.S.C. § 1983.*fn2 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have no discretion with regard to exhaustion; it is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). The law requires "proper" exhaustion, that is, the prisoner must comply with appropriate deadlines and other critical procedural rules. Id. at 90. Thus, a plaintiff has not properly exhausted his administrative ...