The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Munley
Before the court are the parties' objections to the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, which proposes that the court grant Plaintiff Reynolds Packaging Kama, Inc. ("Reynolds") motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim and deny plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Defendant Inline Plastics Corporation's ("Inline") counterclaim.
This case concerns the financial dealings between Reynolds and Inline. Plaintiff Reynolds is a supplier of oriented polystyrene sheet ("OPS") and polystyrene terephthalate sheet ("PET") products. (Plaintiff's Statement of Facts in Support of Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Statement") at ¶ 1). Defendant Inline uses and purchases OPS and PET products. (Id. at ¶ 2). The parties entered into an agreement on or about September 1, 2003 whereby Inline agreed to purchase from Reynolds these products. (Id. at ¶ 3). As a result of this agreement, Inline owed Reynolds $5,881,901.70 on June 30, 2006. (Id. at ¶ 4). Inline disputes the exact amount of its obligation, as well as whether the obligation arose before or after the company fulfilled its obligations under the contract. (Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement (Exh. 1 to Doc. 39) (hereinafter "Defendant's Response") at ¶ 4).
The parties entered into a new supply agreement on or about July 1, 2006. (Plaintiff's Statement at ¶ 5). That agreement had a stated term of two years. (Id. at ¶ 6). Inline remained indebted to Reynolds when this agreement expired on June 30, 2008. (Id. at ¶ 7). The parties disagree on the precise amount of this debt. Plaintiff contends that defendant owes approximately $2.8 million. (Id.). Inline insists that it made two quarterly payments while the case was pending, and that current indebtedness to Reynolds now totals a little more than $2.2 million. (Defendant's Response at ¶ 7).
Reynolds continued periodically to supply Inline with products from July 1, 2008 until October 2008. (Plaintiff's Statement at ¶ 8). The parties disagree about whether they had a contract to supply these goods after the 2006 contract expired at the end of June 2008. (Id. at ¶ 9; Defendant's Response at ¶ 9). Defendant claims that a "contractual relationship" arose after July 1, 2008 which obligated Reynolds to supply Inline with OPS and PET until January 2009. (Defendant's Response at ¶ 9).
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this court on October 15, 2008. (Doc. 1). The complaint raises a claim for breach of contract. The plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the 2003 supply agreement by failing to pay amounts due under that agreement and failing to pay invoices issued by Reynolds under the 2006 contract. (Id. at ¶ 19). Count II of the complaint alleges unjust enrichment for Inline's taking delivery of Reynolds's product and not paying for it. Count III raises a claim for promissory estoppel, alleging that Inline should have known its promise to pay for product supplied by Reynolds induced Reynolds to supply that product and that Reynolds should therefore be paid for the product. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt for pre-trial proceedings. Inline filed a counterclaim along with its answer. The counterclaim alleged that Reynolds had breached a contract with defendant to supply Inline with plastic products after October 10, 2008.
After the parties completed discovery, plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment on both its claims and on the defendant's counterclaim. (Doc. 28). After the parties initially briefed the issues the case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson. (See Doc. 44). Magistrate Judge Carlson allowed additional briefing and then heard argument on the plaintiff's motion. On February 1, 2010, Magistrate Judge Carlson issued his report and recommendation. (Doc. 61). He concluded that the parol evidence rule barred consideration of any document or evidence outside of the 2006 contract between the parties, and found that summary judgment was appropriate for the plaintiff on its breach of contract claim. The magistrate judge found, however, that summary judgment was inappropriate on the defendant's counterclaim. Evidence existed, the magistrate judge found, by which a jury could conclude that a contract existed between the parties after October 2008.
The parties filed objections to the report and recommendation, bringing the case to its present posture.
The plaintiff is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia. Defendant is a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in that state. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The court therefore has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1441. Because the court is sitting in diversity, the substantive law of Pennsylvania applies. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Legal Standard
In disposing of objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C); see also Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1987). This court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The district court judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id.
When no objections to the report and recommendation are made, the court must determine whether a review of the record evidences plain error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1085 (3d Cir. 1983); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) 1983 Advisory Committee Notes ("When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record to accept the recommendation"); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are before the court on motions for summary judgment. Granting summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Knabe v. Boury, 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary ...