The opinion of the court was delivered by: Eduardo C. Robreno, J.
Cravath, Swaine and Moore LLP ("Cravath") requests this Court to abstain and/or stay consideration of Plaintiff's petition for a preliminary injunction while the issue of Cravath's disqualification to represent a party in litigation in Delaware is being considered by the Delaware Chancery Court (doc. no. 4).
This lawsuit is a tale of one law firm's representation of two different clients who are business competitors. When, how and under what terms and conditions the representation occurred are factual questions. The ultimate legal issue is whether the allegedly dual representation violated the rules of professional conduct and/or the fiduciary duty owed by the law firm to each of its clients.
Cravath is a New York-based law firm. Airgas, Inc. ("Airgas") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. ("Air Products") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, located forty miles from Airgas. Airgas and Air Products are competitors in the industrial, packaged gases business. Cravath has provided legal representation to Air Products for over forty years. Meanwhile, Airgas has been a client of Cravath for nine years.
The parties hotly dispute the nature of Cravath's representation of the parties, the scope of the representation and when Cravath's representation of Airgas came to an end. Also in dispute is the nature of the information Cravath learned while representing Airgas.
These issues came to the forefront in the past five months when Air Products, with the assistance of Cravath, sought to engage Airgas in discussions about a possible merger of the two companies. On February 4, 2010, when these initial overtures were rejected by Airgas, Air Products publicly announced an all cash offer to purchase all outstanding Airgas shares. That same day, Air Products filed suit in the Delaware Chancery Court against Airgas and its Board of Directors alleging that their failure to consider Air Products' offer is a breach of fiduciary duty ("the Delaware Action"). Cravath is representing Air Products in that action.
The very next day, on February 5, 2010, Airgas sued Cravath in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas for damages and also a special injunction (TRO) and preliminary injunction restraining Cravath from representing Air Products in the Delaware Action and from otherwise representing Air Products in the proposed acquisition of Airgas (the "Pennsylvania Action"). Airgas claims that Cravath violated Rule 1.7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct*fn1 by simultaneously representing Airgas in financing related matters and advising Air Products on a potential takeover of Airgas. Airgas, in the Pennsylvania Action, is seeking to enjoin Cravath from representing Air Products in any matter related to the attempted acquisition of Airgas, including banning Cravath from representing Air Products in the Delaware Action.
Over the past two weeks, there has been rapid action in this now two front legal battle. On February 9, 2010, the Honorable Albert Sheppard, of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, after hearing argument from counsel, declined Airgas' request to grant a TRO and instead scheduled an evidentiary hearing on a request for a preliminary injunction for February 16, 2010. Despite having won the initial scrimmage before the Pennsylvania state court, on February 12, 2010, Cravath removed the Pennsylvania Action to this Court (the "Federal Action"). Immediately thereafter, Cravath moved for this Court to abstain and/or stay the Federal Action pending resolution of the issue of disqualification in the Delaware Action.
Meanwhile, Airgas has moved to disqualify Cravath from representing Air Products in the Delaware Action by filing a motion in the Federal Action (doc. no. 18) and also objecting to Cravath's representation of Air Products in the Delaware Action.
It is Cravath's motion to abstain and/or stay the Federal Action pending resolution of the issue of Cravath's disqualification in the Delaware Action that is before the Court at this time.
"[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). While the ordering of an indefinite stay can constitute an abuse of discretion, Dover v. Diguglielmo, 181 Fed. Appx. 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255), the Court is, nonetheless, empowered to stay proceedings pending the outcome of related proceedings. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) (trial court has discretion under the Sherman Act to determine whether to stay a civil action pending outcome of a criminal trial); Cofab, Inc. v. Phila. Joint Bd. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL CIO-CLC, 141 F.3d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to issue writ of mandamus reversing an order staying a federal action pending completion of related proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Underwriters, Inc., 846 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1988) (district court has discretion to stay litigation among non-arbitrating parties pending the outcome of a related arbitration).
"[The] decision [to stay litigation] is one left to the district court... as a matter of its discretion to control its docket." Mendez v. Puerto Rican Int'l Cos., 553 F.3d 709, 712 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 n.23 (1983)). Generally, in the exercise of its sound discretion, a court may hold one lawsuit in abeyance to abide the outcome of another which may substantially affect it or be dispositive of ...