Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Gidley v. Allstate Insurance Co.

December 17, 2009

JANET GIDLEY AND NORMAN GIDLEY,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY



The opinion of the court was delivered by: O'Neill, J.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs Janet Gidley and Norman Gidley filed a complaint in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County and the case was subsequently removed to this Court on August 13, 2009. On October 6, 2009, I dismissed counts II and IV of plaintiff's original complaint and granted plaintiffs leave to amend count IV. On October 13, 2009, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. Subsequently, defendant Allstate Insurance Company moved to dismiss count III of the amended complaint (previously count IV of the original complaint). I have before me now defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' response and defendant's reply. The relevant background is set forth in my opinion of October 6, 2009.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss all or part of an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Typically, "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations," though a plaintiff's obligation to state the grounds of entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id., citations omitted. The complaint must state "'enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter School Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008), quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

The Court of Appeals has recently made clear that after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1955, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009), "conclusory or 'bare-bones' allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: 'threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out 'sufficient factual matter' to show that the claim is facially plausible." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, No. 07-4285, 2009 WL 2501662, at * 4 (3d Cir. 2009). The Court explained, "a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id., citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). "Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss count III of plaintiffs' amended complaint which alleges a violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 Pa. Stat. § 201-1 et seq. (UTPCPL). Previously, I dismissed plaintiffs' UTPCPL claim and granted leave to amend because the original complaint lacked "allegations of justifiable reliance and causation, elements essential to any UTPCPL claim." Gidley v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 09-3701, 2009 WL 3199599, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ("Gidley I") (quoting Seldon v. Home Loan Services, Inc., No. 07-04480, 2009 WL 2394182, at * 13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2009), and citing Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiffs' amended complaint adds the following two paragraphs:

9. At all times material herein, when Plaintiffs purchased insurance from Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company and thereafter, they justifiably relied on the representations of Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, by and through their agents, that Allstate Insurance Company would promptly investigate and pay for any motor vehicle loss claims, available under the aforementioned policy of automobile insurance, suffered by the Plaintiffs. . . . .

92. All of the foregoing [allegations of 'unfair deceptive practices'] was in contravention to the representations made by the agents of Defendant, Allstate, which were justifiably relied on by Plaintiffs, in purchasing automobile insurance from Defendant, Allstate, that they would abide their fiduciary and contractual obligations under the automobile policy and fairly resolve all claims; additionally that Plaintiffs were 'in good hands with Allstate.'

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9 and 92.

In my prior opinion, I construed plaintiffs' complaint to allege a cause of action under the UTPCPL's "catch-all" provision.*fn1 The catch-all prohibits "engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding." 73 Pa. Stat. § 201-2(4)(xxi). Plaintiffs must also show that they justifiably relied on that conduct and that it caused their injury. Gidley I, at *3.

Defendants argue that a claim under the catch-all provision requires plaintiffs to prove the elements of common law fraud and, consequently, to plead the claim with particularity as required by Rule 9(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring party to "state with particularity the circumstances constituting ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.