The opinion of the court was delivered by: United States Magistrate Judge Susan Paradise Baxter.
A. Relevant Procedural and Factual History
Plaintiff Marquis Green, a prisoner incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, Pennsylvania [SCI-Albion], brings this action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against: Sgt. D. Wertz, a corrections officer at SCI Albion ("Wertz"); Lt. J.D. Robertson, a corrections officer at SCI-Albion ("Robertson"); and Raymond Sobina, Superintendent at SCI-Albion ("Sobina").
In his pro se complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution by confiscating a digital coaxial cable that he had purchased. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that, on October 3, 2008, he "went to property to pick up [his] new KTV digital TV[, but Defendant] Wertz would not allow [him] to retain the digital coaxial cable that was included in the purchase of the TV and will be necessary for its operation to receive digital signals come 2-17-09." (Complaint at Section IV.C). Plaintiff alleges further that Defendant Wertz failed to issue him a DC-154A confiscation slip and would not allow him to send the cable home "per DOC policy." (Id.). According to Plaintiff, both Defendants Robertson and Sobina reviewed and denied his grievance regarding the confiscation of the cable. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that, without the cable, he "will not be able to use a 'rabbit ears' type antenna to receive digital signals," and, thus, will be "forced to subscribe to the institutional cable system." (Id.). As relief for his claim, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, and/or the return of his coaxial cable.
On April 10, 2009, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. [Document # 15]. Plaintiff has since filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion, essentially restating the allegations of his complaint. [Document # 22]. This matter is now ripe for consideration
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 95 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)(rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (May 18, 2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).
The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. February 22, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3.
Recently, the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal/Phillips line of cases:
To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
After Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The district court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an entitlement with its facts. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but ...