The opinion of the court was delivered by: James F. McClure, Jr. United States District Judge
On July 9, 2007, Charles Howard Stinson, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, an institution located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents are David J. Wakefield and the Pennsylvania State Attorney General.
On July 18, 2009, respondents filed what the court construed to be a partial answer (Rec. Doc. No. 37) and a brief in support of the partial answer (Rec. Doc. No 28). Respondents' partial answer asserted that Stinson's habeas petition should be dismissed as untimely. Petitioner was granted an extension of time within which to file an opposing brief. On July 8, 2009 petitioner filed a response, and he filed a supplemental response on July 13, 2009. (Rec. Doc. Nos. 46 and 47).
Also pending is petitioner's partial motion for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. No. 29). On June 30, 2009, we ordered that respondents were not required to filed an opposing brief until further order of the court.
Now, for the following reasons, we will direct respondents to answer the petition and also file a responsive brief to petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of --
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through ...