The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Caputo
Plaintiff, Telly Royster, an inmate formerly housed at the Camp Hill State Correctional Institution (SCI-Camp Hill), Camp Hill, Pennsylvania,*fn1 commenced this civil rights action on October 11, 2005, after he was allegedly assaulted by Department of Corrections (DOC) staff on July 3, 2004, and then denied medical care for his injuries. Mr. Royster filed an Amended Complaint on February 10, 2006. (Doc. 23, Amended Complaint.) Following the resolution of several motions to dismiss, and the DOC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the following Eighth Amendment claims remain: Mr. Royster's excessive use of force claim against the remaining DOC Defendants and a denial of medical treatment for the resulting injuries by both corrections and contract medical staff.*fn2
On October 8, 2008, the contract medical care defendants filed for summary judgment based on Mr. Royster's alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the Eighth Amendment medical claims lodged against them, or in the alternative, failure to state an Eighth Amendment claim of their deliberate indifference to a serious medical need following his alleged July 3, 2004, assault by the DOC defendants. On April 6, 2009, the Court directed Mr. Royster to respond only to the moving defendants' exhaustion argument. (See Doc. 155, Order of April 6, 2009.) Mr. Royster was to file his opposition materials on or before April 24, 2009. To date, Mr. Royster has not filed a response to the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment, or sought an enlargement of time to do so.
For the reasons that follow, the contract medical care defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
The following facts are undisputed, and unless otherwise noted, are presented in the light most favorable to Mr. Royster.*fn3 Mr. Royster contends DOC staff assaulted him on July 3, 2004, while housed in SCI-Camp Hill's Special Management Unit (SMU). (Doc. 140, Defendants' Newfield and Spaeder's Statement of Uncontested Facts (DSF) at ¶ 11.) The first time Mr. Royster saw Physician's Assistant (PA) Spaeder regarding complaints of pain after the July 3, 2004 assault was on July 6, 2004. (Id. at ¶ 36 and ¶ 62.) Mr. Royster saw PA Newfield for the first time on July 14, 2004, regarding a complaint of pain and ocular photosensitivity after the July 3, 2004, assault. (Id. at ¶ 21.) On July 16, 2004, PA Newfield saw Telly Royster a second time concerning the use of Tylenol for headaches and pain. (Id. at ¶ 22.)
On July 2, 2004, Mr. Royster filed Grievance No. 88664, alleging that he was assaulted by DOC corrections officers and denied medical care by Nurse Woodyard, a DOC defendant. (Id. at ¶24 and Doc. 141-7, Defendants' Exhibits in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. F at R. 5.)*fn4 On July 7, 2004, SCI-Camp Hill's Grievance Coordinator Ian Taggart advised Mr. Royster that his grievance would be forwarded to the institution's security office for their investigation. (Doc. 141-6, Defs.' Exhibits at R. 52.) On August 26, 2004, Security Lieutenant Reading denied Mr. Royster's grievance. (DSF at ¶ 26; Doc. 141-7 at R. 4.) On August 31, 2004, Superintendent Kelchner denied Telly Royster's grievance appeal. (Doc. 141-7 at R. 2.) The DOC's Chief Grievance Officer denied grievance no. 88664 at final review. (Doc. 141-7 at R. 1.) Telly Royster did not file any grievance that mentions PA Newfield or complains of her conduct. (DSF at ¶ 27.) Likewise, Mr. Royster did not file any grievance that mentions PA Spaeder or complains of his conduct. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Telly Royster has filed numerous grievances over the years against Physician Assistants other than PA Newfield and PA Spaeder. (Id. at ¶ 71.)
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party, and the entire record must be examined in the light most favorable to nonmoving party. Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007).
A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), before a prisoner may bring a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal law, he must exhaust all available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.C. 983, 988, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). The exhaustion requirement of the PLRA is one of "proper exhaustion." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.C. 2378, 2383, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). This means that the prisoner plaintiff must have completed "the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court." (Id.) The "filing [of] an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal" does not satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. (Id.) Failure to substantially comply with procedural requirements of the applicable prison's grievance system will result in a procedural default of the claim. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-32 (3d Cir. 2004). Further, the PLRA "completely precludes a futility exception to its mandatory exhaustion requirement." Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has clearly stated that "there is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212, 127 S.C. 910, 918-19, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Finally, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "there appears to be unanimous circuit court consensus that a prisoner may not fulfill the PLRA's exhaustion requirement by exhausting administrative remedies after the filing of the complaint in federal court." Oriakhi v. United States, 165 Fed. Appx. 991, 993 (3d Cir. 2006)(not precedential).
A prisoner is not required to allege that administrative remedies have been exhausted. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2002). Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies is an affirmative defense. (Id.) As such, it must be plead and proven by ...