The opinion of the court was delivered by: (Judge Muir)
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff Craig A. Kimmel's applications for social security disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSI). For the reasons set forth below we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
Disability insurance benefits are paid to an individual if that individual is disabled and "insured," that is, the individual has worked long enough and paid social security taxes. The last date that a claimant meets the requirements of being insured is commonly referred to as the "date last insured." It is undisputed that Kimmel met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2007. Tr. 68, 163 and 176.*fn1
In order to establish entitlement to disability insurance benefits Kimmel was required to establish that he suffered from a disability on or before that date. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a)(2008); see Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 1990). Supplemental security income is a federal income supplement program funded by general tax revenues (not social security taxes). It is designed to help aged, blind and disabled individuals who have little or no income. Insured status is irrelevant in determining a claimant's eligibility for supplemental security income benefits.
On January 31, 2007, Kimmel protectively*fn2 filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Tr. 152-159, 160-162 and 176.*fn3
Kimmel, who was born on October 15, 1971*fn4 claims that he became disabled on June 7, 2006, because of seizure and anxiety related disorders. Tr. 128 and 198. He further stated in documents filed with the Social Security Administration as follows: "The medications I am required to take make me very drowsy and I cannot drive or work while taking them." Tr. 198. Kimmel completed the 12th grade, and has past relevant work experience as a laborer, forklift operator, and security guard. Tr. 73, 117, 203 and 206. At the time of the onset of his alleged disability Kimmel was not working. Tr. 208. In documents filed with the Social Security Administration Kimmel stated that he worked as a forklift operator through March of 2006. Tr. 208. Social Security earning records reveal that in 2002, Kimmel earned $11,587.64, $2088.87 in 2004 and $4583.16 in 2005. No earnings are reported for 2001, 2003 and 2006. Tr. 164. The laborer positions were obtained through temporary employment agencies and are considered unskilled, light work; the security guard position is considered light work; and the forklift operator position is considered medium, semiskilled work. Tr. 116-118.*fn5
Kimmel's claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration on April 24, 2007. Tr. 124-132. On May 1, 2007, Kimmel requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. Tr. 133. On July 23, 2008, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge. Tr. 86-121. On September 17, 2008, the administrative law judge issued a decision denying Kimmel's applications for benefits. Tr. 68-74. On September 29, 2008, Kimmel filed an appeal of the administrative law judge's decision to the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration. Tr. 62-63. On December 10, 2008, the Appeals Council concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant Kimmel's request for review. Tr. 1-3. Thus, the administrative law judge's decision stood as the final decision of the Commissioner.
On January 9, 2009, Kimmel filed a complaint in this court requesting that we reverse the decision of the Commissioner denying him disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. On the same day the Clerk of Court assigned responsibility for this case to the undersigned for disposition.
The Commissioner filed an answer to the complaint and a copy of the administrative record on March 20, 2009. Kimmel filed his brief on April 17, 2009, and the Commissioner filed his brief on May 26, 2009. The appeal*fn6 became ripe for disposition on May 27, 2009, when Kimmel filed a reply brief.
When considering a social security appeal, we have plenary review of all legal issues decided by the Commissioner. See Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security, 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007); Schaudeck v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999); Krysztoforski v. Chater, 55 F.3d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1995). However, our review of the Commissioner's findings of fact pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is to determine whether those findings are supported by "substantial evidence." Id.; Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
Factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001)("Where the ALJ's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently."); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)("Findings of fact by the Secretary must be accepted as conclusive by a reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence."); Keefe v. Shalala, 71 F.3d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995); Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 & 1529 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990).
Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but 'rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence has been described as more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance. Brown, 845 F.2d at 1213. In an adequately developed factual record substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Substantial evidence exists only "in relationship to all the other evidence in the record," Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706, and "must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the Commissioner ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. The Commissioner must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Johnson, 529 F.3d at 203; Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-707. Therefore, a court reviewing the decision of the Commissioner must scrutinize the record as a whole. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979).
Another critical requirement is that the Commissioner adequately develop the record. Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)("The ALJ has an obligation to develop the record in light of the non-adversarial nature of benefits proceedings, regardless of whether the claimant is represented by counsel."); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 557 (3d Cir. 2005); Fraction v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 451, 454 (8th Cir. 1986); Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 841 (9th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 433. 437 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2085 (2000)("It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits[.]"). If the record is not adequately developed, remand for further proceedings is appropriate. Id.
To receive disability benefits, the plaintiff must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(1)(A). Furthermore,
[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists in the national economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner utilizes a five-step process in evaluating disability insurance and supplemental security income claims. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91-92. This process requires the Commissioner to consider, in sequence, whether a claimant (1) is engaging in substantial gainful activity,*fn7 (2) has an impairment that is severe or a combination of impairments that is severe,*fn8 (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment,*fn9 (4) has the residual functional capacity to return to his or her past work and (5) if not, whether he or she can perform other work in the national economy. Id. As part of step four the administrative law judge must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity. Id.*fn10
Residual functional capacity is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis. See Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34475 (July 2, 1996). The residual functional capacity assessment must include a discussion of the individual's abilities. Id; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 and 416.945; Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 359 n.1 ("'Residual functional capacity' is defined as that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).").
In this case the administrative law judge at step one found that Kimmel had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since June 7, 2006, the alleged onset date of Kimmel's ...