The opinion of the court was delivered by: O'neill, J.
On August 3, 2007, plaintiff Philip Youtie filed a complaint against defendant Macy's Inc. (Macy's),*fn1 and on March 26, 2009, filed an amended complaint against defendants Macy's and Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc. (Macy's Retail),*fn2 alleging a breach of plaintiff's employment agreement and violations of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq. Defendants filed an answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaims on December 17, 2007, alleging that plaintiff breached his employment agreement, misappropriated trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breached his fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, engaged in tortious interference with business and employment relations, was unjustly enriched and engaged in unfair competition. Defendants request a hearing on damages.
Defendants seek declaratory relief regarding whether Macy's Retail lawfully assigned plaintiff's employment agreement on January 31, 2007 to David's Bridal, Inc. and injunctive and monetary relief. Presently before me are defendants' motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims, plaintiff's response and cross-motion for summary judgment on defendants' counterclaims,*fn3 defendants' reply thereto, plaintiff's reply in support of his cross-motion for summary judgment and defendants' sur-reply thereto, and defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to its counterclaims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty and misappropriation of confidential and proprietary information, plaintiff's response and defendants' reply thereto.
On August 1, 2000, Macy's acquired all of the publicly-held shares of David's Bridal, Inc. David's Bridal is a corporation and a clothier specializing in bridal gowns and other formal wear and accessories. Plaintiff had purchased David's Bridal in 1972, expanded the operations, partnered with Steven Erlbaum beginning in 1989 or 1990 and with Erlbaum made a public offering of David's Bridal's stock in 1999. After Macy's acquired David's Bridal, plaintiff entered into a contract of employment with a division of Macy's, Macy's Retail, on or about October 1, 2001. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, Youtie served as the Executive Vice-President, Product Development and Sourcing of the David's Bridal division of Macy's Retail. On November 17, 2006, an affiliate of Leonard Green & Partners signed an agreement with Macy's to acquire David's Bridal and consummated the sale and transfer of stock of David's Bridal to the Leonard Green affiliate on January 31, 2007. As part of the transaction, Macy's subsidiary Macy's Retail assigned its employment agreement with plaintiff to David's Bridal. The agreement provided in relevant part:
11. Successors and Assigns. This Agreement will inure to the benefit of, and will be binding upon, May, its successors and assigns; provided, however, that, because this is an agreement for the personal services [sic], you cannot assign any of your obligations under this Agreement to anyone else. May may assign its obligations under this Agreement to a May subsidiary; any assignment, however, will not relieve May of any of its obligations hereunder except to the extent that they are actually discharged by the subsidiary. Whenever this Agreement refers to May, that reference includes any of May subsidiaries or divisions in existence at any time during which this Agreement governs the conduct of you and May.
Plaintiff alleges that, at the time his employment agreement was assigned to David's Bridal he was not aware of, let alone did he consent to, the purported assignment. Plaintiff argues that he was therefore no longer an employee of Macy's Retail and, as a result of the termination of his employment, was entitled to the severance obligations set forth in Paragraph 4(c) and (f) of the agreement.
Defendants contest plaintiff's claims and his entitlement to severance. Additionally, defendants argue that plaintiff's conduct during his employment created their causes of action against him.
Defendants claim that, in late 2006, plaintiff asked Linda Shaps-Shanin, Vice President and General Merchandising Manager of David's Bridal, for "first cost" data involving the costs incurred by the company to manufacture its bridal dresses and gowns. It is further alleged that, despite being denied access to this information, plaintiff renewed his request for such information to Shaps-Shanin and her assistant Sharon Zuk in January 2007 but was again denied. Plaintiff denies that he asked Shaps-Shanin or Zuk for the "first cost" data. However, plaintiff admits that he obtained "first cost" data on the dresses in David's Bridal's Spring 2007 catalogue from Lydia Chow, an employee of Fillberg LTD, David's Bridal's Hong Kong marketing representation, during a business trip to Hong Kong in January 2007 with other David's Bridal employees. Plaintiff does not dispute that the "first cost" data at issue is the cost the manufacturer charged David's Bridal to manufacture the designs David's Bridal provided the manufacturer for its Spring 2007 catalogue. Additionally, plaintiff admitted in his affidavit that he "asked for the cost data because  Erlbaum . . . was interested in what David's Bridal paid various manufacturers for the dresses they manufactured." Plaintiff further admits that he gave a copy of the cost sheet to Erlbaum but believes that plaintiff provided it to Erlbaum after plaintiff recovered from the surgical procedure he underwent after his January trip to Hong Kong.
Plaintiff also admits that he and his former partner Erlbaum had general discussions about Erlbaum returning to the bridal business. However, he states that no specifics were discussed and that neither had plans to enter into a business in competition with David's Bridal. In his deposition on June 4, 2008, plaintiff testified that, during the period in which he was still employed by David's Bridal, he and Erlbaum discussed starting a business in "direct competition" with David's Bridal but that no specifics were discussed. However, in his December 2008 affidavit, plaintiff claimed that the potential business discussed was "a wholesale dress manufacturing business in an off-shore location" that "would not compete in any way with David's Bridal."
Plaintiff admits that he introduced Shaps-Shanin to Erlbaum on January 29, 2007 but claims that he did so at her request. He also admits that, after this meeting, he asked ShapsShanin for a copy of her employment agreement but claims that she refused to give it to him. Although Shaps-Shanin asserted that Erlbaum "attempted to convince [her] to join [him] in a competing bridal business," plaintiff argues that it is uncontroverted that Erlbaum never established any type of business and that Shaps-Shanin never left David's Bridal's employ. Defendants dispute that Shaps-Shanin in any way instigated her introduction to Erlbaum.
Section 6(a) of the Employment Agreement prohibited plaintiff "at any time, directly or indirectly, [from] us[ing] or disclos[ing] any of May's [aka Macy's Retails'] Confidential Information except as authorized and within the scope of [his] employment with May [aka Macy's Retail.]" Section 6(d) defines Confidential Information as: any non-public information pertaining to May's business. Confidential information includes information disclosed by May to you, and information developed or learned by you during the course of or as a result of your employment with May, which you also agree is May's property . . . . Confidential information includes, without limitation, information and documents concerning May's processes, suppliers (including May's terms, conditions and other business arrangements with suppliers); supplier and customer lists; advertising and marketing plans and strategies; profit margins; seasonal plans, goals objectives and projections; compilations, anaylses and projections regarding May's divisions, stores, product segments, product lines, suppliers, sales and expenses; files; trade secrets and patent applications (prior to their being public); salary, staffing and employment information (including information about performance of other executives); and "know-how," techniques or any technical information not of a published nature relating, for example, how May conducts its business.
The agreement also contained a non-compete clause for conflicts of interest constraining plaintiff with the following language:
5. Avoiding Conflict of Interest. (a) At all times while you are employed by May and for one year after your employment terminates, you will not directly or indirectly:
(i) own, manage, operate, finance, join, control, advise, consult, render services to, have an interest or future interest in or participate in the ownership, management, operation, financing or control of, or be employed by or connected in any manner with any Competing Business;
(ii) solicit for employment, hire or offer employment to, or otherwise aid or assist (by disclosing information about employees or otherwise) any person or entity other than David's Bridal, May or another May subsidiarty in soliciting for employment, hiring or offering employment to, any employee of David's Bridal, May or another May subsidiary; or
(iii) take any action which is intended to harm David's Bridal or May or either of their reputations, or that David's Bridal or May reasonably concludes could harm David's Bridal or May or their reputations or lead to unwanted or unfavorable publicity for David's Bridal or May.
David's Bridal terminated plaintiff's employment as Executive Vice President on February 27, 2007 based upon his allegedly competitive and disloyal conduct.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part, that summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party sustains the burden, the nonmoving party must set forth facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rule 56(e) provides that when a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The adverse party therefore must raise "more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor" in order to overcome a summary judgment motion, and cannot survive by relying on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989). However, the "existence of disputed issues of material fact should be ascertained by resolving 'all inferences, doubts and issues of credibility against'" the moving party. Ely v. Hall's Motor Transit Co., 590 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 1978), quoting Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 878 (3d Cir. 1972).
Plaintiff claims that defendants breached the employment agreement by improperly and illegally assigning his employment contract to David's Bridal which resulted in a termination without cause and his entitlement to severance payments. Because defendants did not make such payments, plaintiff alleges defendants violated the WPCL. Defendants' counterclaims of breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and/or confidential and proprietary information, breach of fiduciary duty and duty of loyalty, tortious interference with business and employment relations, unjust enrichment and unfair competition rest on two ...