The opinion of the court was delivered by: Buckwalter, S. J.
Currently pending before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiff, The Knit With, Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Requesting Certification of Finality to Order of December 18, 2008 Dismissing Count Three of Plaintiff's Complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
This case arises from a dispute between Plaintiff, The Knit With ("The Knit"), a small, family-owned and operated business retailing specialty yarns and accessories to consumers, and Defendant Knitting Fever, Inc. ("KFI"), a New York corporation that manufactures and distributes specialty yarns. At the core of the dispute is a claim that KFI sold yarns to The Knit, representing that they contained a percentage of cashmere, which they purportedly did not.*fn1
On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff initiated litigation against KFI, its officers/directors, and several related entities, alleging that, as a consequence of the false labeling of three of the six cashmere-blend yarns at issue, its business and commercial interests were harmed. (Compl., The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-4221 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 2, 2008) ("The Knit With I").) The Complaint set forth several causes of action, including: (1) breach of the express warranty of merchantability; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (4) injury to business and property pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (5) conspiracy to cause injury to business and property pursuant to RICO; (6) perfidious trade practices (deceit) under the common law of unfair competition; and (7) piercing the corporate veil. (Id. ¶¶ 82-150.) Defendants moved, on September 24, 2008, to dismiss the third, fourth, and fifth counts.
On October 6, 2008, Plaintiff initiated a second litigation against KFI, as well as the Japanese manufacturers of the remaining three cashmere-blend yarns at issue. (Compl., The Knit With v. Eisaku Noro & Co., Ltd., Civ. A. No. 08-4775 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2008) ("The Knit With II").) The Complaint in that case alleged the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty of merchantability of goods for resale to consumers; (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability of goods for resale to consumers; (3) explicitly false advertising pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (4) perfidious trade practices and common law unfair competition; (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) piercing the corporate veil. On November 10, 2008, Defendants filed another motion to dismiss. (Id. ¶¶ 35-82.)
On December 18, 2008, this Court, in The Knit With I, granted the motion to dismiss the Lanham Act claim for lack of standing, but denied the motion to dismiss the RICO claims. The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-4221, 2008 WL 5381349, at *1-6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2008). The following day, the Court also dismissed the Lanham Act claim in The Knit With II on standing grounds. The Knit With v. Eisaku Noro and Co., Ltd., Civ. A. No. 08-4775, 2008 WL 5273582 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2008). By way of Order dated December 23, 2008, the Court consolidated both actions under the first civil action number.
Defendants Knitting Fever, Inc., Sion Elalouf, Diane Elalouf, Jeffrey J. Denecke, and Jay Opperman (collectively "Answering Defendants") filed their Answer and Counterclaims on January 6, 2009. Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims and Strike Affirmative Defenses. The Court issued a Memorandum and Order, dated April 8, 2009, granting Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Affirmative Defense, but denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss both the Counterclaims and the remaining six Affirmative Defenses. The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Civ. A. Nos. 08-4221, 08-4775, 2009 WL 973492 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2009).
On March 16, 2009, Plaintiff filed the current Motion, pursuant to Rule 54(b), Seeking the Court's Certification as Final of the December 18, 2008 Order Dismissing Count Three of Plaintiff's Complaint -- i.e. the Lanham Act claim. Answering Defendants responded on April 2, 2009, and Plaintiff filed its Reply Brief on April 17, 2009. Having thoroughly considered the briefing by the parties, the Court now turns to a discussion of Plaintiff's motion.
It is well-established that, with certain exceptions, the Court of Appeals generally has jurisdiction to review only "final decisions" of the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 154 (3d Cir. 2005). "A decision ordinarily is final when it ends the litigation and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Public Util. Comm'n, 273 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir. 2001). While an order disposing of either fewer than all the claims or the rights and liability of fewer than all parties is normally not appealable, an exception to this rule exists when the district court certifies an order as appealable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). In re G-I Holdings, Inc., Civ. A. No 02-3626, 2005 WL 3370020, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2005). Rule 54(b) permits the district court to separate out final decisions for immediate appeal in multi-claim or multi-party litigation, as follows:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, . . ., or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for entry of judgment.
The Third Circuit, however, has been clear: "[Rule] 54(b) orders should not be entered routinely or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel." Panichella v. Pa. R.R. Co., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958); see also Murphy v. Secs. Investor Prot. Corp., Civ. A. No. 05-2311, 2005 WL 2649310, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2005) (affirmatively citing Panichella). Rather, "the burden is on the party seeking final certification to convince the district court that the case is the 'infrequent harsh case' meriting a favorable exercise of discretion." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. ...