The opinion of the court was delivered by: Baylson, J.
MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR REDUCTION IN SENTENCE
I. Background Facts and Procedural History
On February 25, 2004, Defendant pled guilty to one count of an indictment charging him with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base ("crack") and one-thousand grams or more of heroin within one-thousand feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and 860. The parties stipulated that two kilograms or more of crack and ten kilograms or more of heroin were distributed by Defendant and his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Given his base offense level and criminal history category under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."), Defendant fell into a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months imprisonment.*fn1 However, Count 1 carried a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment, which became the Guideline sentence under § 5G1.1. Despite those provisions, on December 9, 2005, this Court granted the government's motion for a downward departure for substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and sentenced Defendant to 144 months imprisonment.
Defendant has now filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). That statute allows for the modification of a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed if the sentence was "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Defendant asserts that he is entitled to be resentenced under that statute because Amendments 706 and 715 to the Guidelines recently reduced the offense levels and suggested ranges in § 2D1.1 for offenses involving cocaine base, and Defendant pled guilty to and was sentenced for such an offense.
Defendant argues that the sentence imposed was based, at least in part, on what his sentence would have been under § 2D1.1 of the Guidelines, without the mandatory minimum or downward departure. As support for his conclusion, Defendant notes that the final Judgment identifies the otherwise applicable sentencing range under § 2D1.1. According to Defendant, the Court should reconsider his sentence using a base offense level of 35-the level Defendant argues he would be assigned after the recent amendments-and calculate the downward departure from the sentencing range associated with that level, 210 to 262 months imprisonment.
Section 3582(c)(2) provides:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) . . . , the court may reduce the term of imprisonment after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 identifies the Amendments that may be retroactively applied pursuant to the authority granted in § 3582(c)(2). The Sentencing Commission added Amendments 706 and 715 to that list, effective March 3, 2008 and May 1, 2008 respectively. As a result, prisoners sentenced pursuant to § 2D1.1 are entitled to request a reduction in their sentences under § 3582(c)(2).
However, for Defendant to be eligible for a reduction, his sentence must be "based on" a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Defendant cites to an unpublished Eastern District of Pennsylvania case that found the defendant, who had been granted a downward departure from a mandatory minimum sentence, eligible for reduction because the sentencing Court "necessarily took into account, among other factors, the actual guideline range which would have been applicable but for the mandatory minimum." United States v. Hedgebeth, 2008 WL 2719574, at * 1 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2008) (Fullam, J.). Judge Fullam concluded that the imposed sentence was "at least to some extent, influence by, and therefore 'based on,'" a lowered sentencing range. Id. However, the Third Circuit recently rejected a similar "consulted" argument when it determined that a defendant sentenced pursuant to the career offender provision was not eligible for a reduction even if the court first looked to the otherwise applicable § 2D1.1 range to determine the sentence under the career offender provision. United States v. Mateo, - F.3d -, 2009 WL 750411, at *2 (3d Cir. 2009).
In Mateo, the Third Circuit explained that the language in § 3582(c)(2) is "clear and unambiguous: 'the term "sentencing range" clearly contemplates the end result of the overall guideline calculus, not the series of tentative results reached at various interim steps in the performance of that calculus.'" Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2008)). The Third Circuit ultimately concluded that "'if an amended guideline does not have the effect of lowering the sentencing range actually used at sentencing, the defendant's sentence was not based on that range within the intendment of [§ 3582(c)(2)].'" Id. (quoting Caraballo, 552 F.3d at 10). A defendant is thus not entitled to a reduction in sentence merely because he was convicted of or pled guilty to a cocaine base offense; rather, the defendant is eligible for a reduction only if his sentence would have been lower had it been imposed after the amendments.
Just as the Third Circuit found that the recent amendments would not have lowered a sentence imposed under the career offender provision, the amendments to § 2D1.1 would not have affected a sentence derived from a mandatory minimum and a § 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure from that minimum. In the present case, Defendant essentially asserts, as did the defendant in Mateo, that because this Court "consulted" the original base offense level to determine the sentence after the departure, Defendant is eligible for a reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(2). However, for several reasons, this Court cannot find that Defendant's sentence was "based on" the amended sentencing guidelines and therefore that Defendant is eligible for a reduction.
First, the only evidence Defendant offers to demonstrate that the Court actually did consider, or base its sentence in part on, the § 2D1.1 level is the standard Judgment form. That form requires the Court to complete a section identifying the applicable § 2D1.1 level and corresponding range, even when departing from that range. However, this Court cannot rely on that standard form to determine that the otherwise applicable base level had any influence on the sentence, let alone that the base level served as a "starting point" from which this Court calculated the downward departure.*fn2 Even if the Court had considered the otherwise applicable sentencing range under § 2D1.1, a sentencing court's consideration of the otherwise applicable sentencing range ...