The opinion of the court was delivered by: Buckwalter, S. J.
Currently pending before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiff The Knit With to Dismiss Counterclaims and Strike Affirmative Defenses. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied in part and granted in part.
This case arises from a dispute between Plaintiff, The Knit With ("The Knit"), a small, family-owned and operated business retailing specialty yarns and accessories to consumers, and Defendant Knitting Fever, Inc. ("KFI"), a New York corporation that manufactures and distributes specialty yarns. At the core of the dispute is a claim that KFI sold yarns to The Knit, representing that they contained a percentage of cashmere, which, in fact, they did not.*fn1
On September 2, 2008, Plaintiff initiated litigation against KFI, its officers/directors, and several related entities, alleging that, as a consequence of the false labeling of three of the six Cashmerino yarns at issue, its business and commercial interests were harmed. (Compl., The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-4221 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 2, 2008) ("The Knit With I").) The Complaint set forth several causes of action, including: (1) breach of the express warranty of merchantability; (2) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (3) false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (4) injury to business and property pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (5) conspiracy to cause injury to business and property pursuant to RICO; (6) perfidious trade practices (deceit) under the common law of unfair competition; and (7) piercing the corporate veil. (Id. ¶¶ 82-150.) Defendants moved, on September 24, 2008, to dismiss the third, fourth, and fifth counts.
On October 6, 2008, Plaintiff initiated a second litigation against KFI, as well as the Japanese manufacturers of the remaining three Cashmerino yarns at issue. (Compl., The Knit With v. Eisaku Noro & Co., Ltd., Civ. A. No. 08-4775 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2008) ("The Knit With II").) The Complaint in that case alleged the following causes of action: (1) breach of express warranty of merchantability of goods for resale to consumers; (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability of goods for resale to consumers; (3) explicitly false advertising pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B); (4) perfidious trade practices and common law unfair competition; (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) piercing the corporate veil. On November 10, 2008, Defendants filed another motion to dismiss. (Id. ¶¶ 35-82.)
On December 18, 2008, this Court, in The Knit With I, granted the motion to dismiss the Lanham Act claim on standing grounds, but denied the motion to dismiss the RICO claims. The Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc., Civ. A. No. 08-4221, 2008 WL 5381349, at *1-6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2008). The following day, the Court also dismissed the Lanham Act claim in The Knit With II. The Knit With v. Eisaku Noro and Co., Ltd., Civ. A. No. 08-4775, 2008 WL 5273582 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2008). By way of Order dated December 23, 2008, the Court consolidated both actions under the first civil action number.
Defendants Knitting Fever, Inc., Sion Elalouf, Diane Elalouf, Jeffrey J. Denecke, and Jay Opperman (collectively "Answering Defendants") filed their Answer and Counterclaims on January 6, 2009. On January 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed the current Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims and Strike Affirmative Defenses. Answering Defendants responded on February 5, 2009, and Plaintiff submitted its Reply Brief on February 19, 2009. The Court now reaches the merits of this pending motion.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIMS
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. U.S., 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), the Supreme Court recognized that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1965. Following Twombly, the Third Circuit has cautioned that the factual allegations in the complaint may not be "so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice which is contemplated by Rule 8." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally, "it is no longer sufficient to allege mere elements of a cause of action; instead 'a complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1969 n.8). Finally, the complaint's "'factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Id. at 234 (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.'" Id. (quotingTwombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965).
Notwithstanding these new dictates, the basic tenets of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review have remained static. Spence v. Brownsville Area Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 08-626, 2008 WL 2779079, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 15, 2008). The general rules of pleading still require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, not detailed factual allegations. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. Further, the court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the court must "determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Pinkerton v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2002).
B. Whether Defendants' Counterclaims Are Untimely
Answering Defendants raise four Counterclaims against Plaintiff: (1) defamation; (2) trade libel; (3) tortious interference with existing contractual relations; and (4) tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. Plaintiff argues that these Counterclaims were filed outside of the one year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5523 and, thus, must be dismissed as time-barred.
The statute of limitations for defamation/trade libel claims provides that any such claim must be brought within one year from the date of accrual. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5523. For tortious interference with contractual relations claims, Pennsylvania courts generally apply the two year statute of limitations of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(3). CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2004). Where, however, "the underlying wrong alleged in the complaint is essentially commercial disparagement by publication of defamatory statements, and the alleged injury springs solely from the act of publication," the claim is governed by the one year statute of limitations for pleading defamation.*fn2 Atiyeh Publ'g., LLC v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 00-1962, 2000 WL 1886574, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000); see also Westwood-Booth v. Davy-Loewy Ltd., Civ. A. No. 97-7539, 1999 WL 219897, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 1999).
All four of the challenged Counterclaims raised by Answering Defendants reference the following set of factual allegations:
164. Beginning in July of 2006 and continuing to the present, The Knit With has engaged in a course of conduct that, upon information and belief, is designed to impugn the reputation of KFI and disparage the quality of its yarn products.
165. This course of conduct includes the publication by The Knit With to its customers as well as to customers of KFI and to the hand knitting yarn trade in general of its goods, and the reputation and character of its employees including Mr. Elalouf, KFI's Chief Executive Officer. These published statements include those made in the October 16, 2006 letter attached as Exhibit 17 to the Complaint sent by KFI to its customers, those made to a reporter for a local newspaper, The Chestnut Hill Local, which appeared in an article published on May 31, 2007, as well as numerous other statements.
166. Following the publication of these statements by The Knit With, KFI experienced a loss of customers as well as a loss of sales. Upon information and belief, KFI also lost prospective customers due to The Knit With's statements to the hand knitting yarn trade in general.
(Answer and Countercl. ¶ 164-166.) Plaintiff argues that, per the express language of these allegations, the sole bases for the purported defamation and interference with contractual relations are: (1) the October 16, 2006 "Recall Letter," and (2) the May 31, 2007 article published in The Chestnut Hill Local. As the Counterclaims were not filed until January 6, 2008 -- more than one year past each of these instances -- Plaintiff concludes that they are time barred.
Plaintiff's contention, however, disregards the well-established "Third Circuit Rule" that a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations may be raised in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 motion only if "the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations." Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted); see also Jaramillo v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 356, 358-359 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that for a Rule 12 dismissal of a claim as time-barred, noncompliance with limitations period must clearly appear on the face of the pleading). Where the face of the pleadings does not ...