Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Horgos v. Regions Bank

March 23, 2009


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan



For the reasons set forth below, and in the Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on March 17, 2009, in the related case of Horgos v. Sararo, et al., Civil Action No. 08-815, (the "Related Action" and the "Related Memorandum Opinion") the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue will be denied but its Motion to Transfer Venue will be granted in the form of transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). It is noted that, in the alternative, were venue properly laid in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the Court would nonetheless have the authority to effect a discretionary transfer, under either 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or §1631. .


This case arises, as does Plaintiff's Related Action against Alfredo J. Sararo, III ("Sararo") and numerous other Defendants, from Sararo's alleged fraud and other misconduct in connection with real estate and related banking transactions in Florida.

More particular, and as detailed in the "Related Memorandum Opinion", in 2001 and again in 2003, Plaintiff, a resident of Sewickley, Pennsylvania, visited Naples, Florida, where he Sararo encouraged him to invest in Florida real estate with proceeds obtained via a refinancing of his Pennsylvania residence completed through Fifth Third Bank's Naples office. The $470,000 proceeds were deposited to a new Fifth Third Naples office account in Plaintiff's name, but "entrusted" to Sararo, and all account/transaction statements were mailed to Sararo's Florida residence at Sararo's request. Plaintiff also asserts that the Bank failed to keep him apprised of account and other activities when he subsequently requested that it do so.

Plaintiff's claims regarding events thereafter are, most fundamentally, that Defendant Sararo, with the complicity/involvement of other Defendants named in the Related Action, conducted fraudulent Florida real estate transactions and Florida banking account fund withdrawals, misappropriated Florida rental proceeds and Florida real estate transaction proceeds; and forged documents in Florida until the fraud was "discovered" in September, 2007.

Plaintiff's claims in this action are, similarly, that Regions Bank improperly permitted Sararo to deplete a $100,000 home equity line of credit which Plaintiff opened at Defendant's Florida office, wrongfully cashed a $15,000 Florida rental proceeds check payable to Plaintiff but fraudulently endorsed by Sararo, and failed to forward any account statements or other notice of the transactions to Plaintiff's Pittsburgh address. The Complaint alleges breach of fiduciary duty and violations of Florida statutory provisions.

Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and to Transfer assert, essentially, that venue is improper because none of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this District; the rlevant contracts expressly provide for governance by Florida law and litigation in a Florida Court; and for reasons of fairness, convenience, justness, efficiency, and other reasons of private and public interest, Florida is a more appropriate forum for this action. The Court concurs.


The Court considering a motion to dismiss "must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).

Once a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that jurisdiction exists in the forum state. See, e.g., IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 257 (3d Cir. 1998); Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 941 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992) Although the Court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true and resolves all doubts in its favor, the plaintiff may not rest solely on the pleadings to satisfy its burden of proof. See Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd. 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002); Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992). Rather, the plaintiff must present evidence that demonstrates a prima facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, i.e., in a case of specific jurisdiction, sufficient minimum contacts. See Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992). If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden then rests with the defendant to demonstrate that an exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum state would nonetheless be violative of due process.

Venue, in a case premised on diversity, may rely on the establishment of personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts or on a "substantial events" analysis addressed largely by consideration of the same allegations. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (providing that venue in a diversity action may arise from (a) defendant's residence in the forum state; (b) the occurrence of a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim", or the situs of a substantial part of the property at issue, in the forum state; or (c) defendant's proper subjection to personal jurisdiction in the forum state "if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought"). The Defendants have the burden of demonstrating that venue is improper. See Myers v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1982).

The statutory provisions applicable to transfer of venue are as follows: The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which governs cases in which the forum court has proper venue, provides simply that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." In the Third Circuit, a plaintiff's choice of forum is generally a significant consideration in deciding a discretionary motion to transfer under § 1404(a). The Circuit has held that § 1404(a) is an appropriate authority for discretionary transfer where venue is proper, even if the forum Court lacks personal jurisdiction. See UnitedStates v. Berkowitz, 328 F.2d 358 (3d Cir. 1964).*fn1 Where transfer is effected under § 1404(a), the law of the transferor forum continues to apply, unless personal jurisdiction was lacking.*fn2

In comparison, another statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), authorizing transfer or dismissal, is expressly applicable when venue is improper.*fn3 See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (concluding that discretionary transfer under § 1406(a) does not require personal jurisdiction); Andrews v. Compusa, Inc., 2000 WL 623234, *3 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 2000) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions holding that § 1406(a) permits transfer absent personal jurisdiction). The Third Circuit has suggested that § 1406(a) is not only an appropriate basis for transfer in the event of improper venue, but that - like § 1404(a) - it may also be used where venue is proper. See Carteret Savings Bank v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 231 & n. 11 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing previously "inconsistent conclusions" amongst district courts "on the question of whether § 1406(a) authorizes a transfer when venue is proper").*fn4 If venue is proper, however, transfer under ยง 1406(a) -rather than dismissal for lack of in personum jurisdiction - requires the plaintiff's consent. Id. ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.