The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ambrose, Chief District Judge
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
In this civil action, Plaintiff, Center Pointe Sleep Associates, LLC ("Plaintiff" or "Center Pointe"), asserts claims against Defendant, Judith L. Panian ("Defendant" or "Panian") for: violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; theft of trade secrets under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5301, et seq.; conversion; intentional interference with contractual relations; and tortious procurement of information by improper means. Center Pointe's claims relate to trade secrets and other confidential information belonging to it that Center Pointe alleges Panian improperly took and downloaded from its computers after her resignation from the company. Panian has filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) as to Plaintiff's claims. (Docket No. 42). For the following reasons, Panian's Motion is denied.*fn1
I. MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
A motion for more definite statement may succeed if a pleading is "so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). The notice pleading standard imposed by the Federal Rules, merely "requires a plaintiff to provide the opponent with fair notice of a claim and the grounds on which that claim is based." Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, "[m]otions for more definite statement are generally disfavored, and should [be granted only] if a pleading is unintelligible, making it virtually impossible for the opposing party to craft a responsive pleading." Synagro-WWT v. Rush Twp., Pa., 204 F. Supp. 2d 827, 849-50 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
Panian complains that Center Pointe's claims do not contain enough detail for her to respond. For example, Panian complains that the portions of the Complaint alleging that she had access to and was exposed to confidential and proprietary information and trade secrets belonging to Center Pointe are insufficiently definite because they do not identify the alleged trade secrets and confidential business information "by client and customer, subject matter, time of development and acquisition, and name of the Center Pointe employee and management person(s) who acquired, procured, developed, and/or formulated the claimed and alleged confidential, proprietary or trade secret information." See Docket No. 42; see also Def.'s Br. Supp. at 6-15. Panian also complains, inter alia, that the portion of the Complaint alleging that she "caused damage without authorization to a protected computer involved in interstate commerce by deleting certain files and sub-files from that protected computer without authorization" is vague because it does not definitely identify the "protected computer" or the "certain files and sub-files." See id.
Panian's arguments are without merit. After careful review, I find that Center Pointe's 76-paragraph Complaint is neither vague nor ambiguous on these or any other issues. For example, the Complaint identifies the trade secrets at issue as relating to "the truck driver sleep apnea screening proposal designed by Center Pointe," as well as "client and prospective client data base information," "client and prospective client lists," and "marketing materials and strategies of Center Pointe." Compl. ¶¶ 26, 53. Further, the Complaint more than adequately describes the computer at issue as the "company-owned laptop computer" that Center Pointe provided to Panian during her employment. Id. ¶¶ 31-37. The Complaint then very specifically alleges that, prior to returning the Center Pointe laptop, Panian "connected a 'SanDisk U3 Cruzer Micro' USB Device -- a small, portable memory device -- to the laptop computer and downloaded certain files therefrom to that memory device." Id. ¶ 33. These and the remaining allegations in the Complaint more than adequately provide Panian with sufficient information to craft a responsive pleading. The additional level of detail and clarification Panian seeks is more appropriately the function of the discovery process, and she should avail herself of that process for such purposes. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, a plaintiff "need only make out a claim upon which relief can be granted. If more facts are necessary to resolve or clarify the disputed issues, the parties may avail themselves of the civil discovery mechanisms under the Federal Rules." Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (The Rule 8(a)(2) notice pleading standard "relies on liberal discovery rules . . . to define disputed issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Cloud, Civil No. 08-1200, 2008 WL 3895895, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2008) (motions for more definite statement are "highly disfavored since the overall scheme of the federal rules calls for relatively skeletal pleadings and places the burden of unearthing factual details on the discovery process." (citations omitted)).
For all of these reasons, Panian's motion for more definite statement is denied.
Although Panian did not file a separate motion to dismiss or mention Rule 12(b)(6) in her motion for a more definite statement, her counsel in the supporting brief requests that I permit the initial motion to be amended to include "defenses and other relief available under Rule 8(a)(2), 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(f)." Def.'s Br. Supp. at 1. In support, the brief cites Wright and Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure for the proposition that "If the pleading is impermissibly vague, the court may act under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(e) whichever is appropriate, without regard to how the motion is denominated." 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1376 (3d ed. 2004). Even if it is proper for me to entertain Panian's arguments under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, those arguments do not warrant dismissal of Center Pointe's Complaint.
In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, I must look to whether the complaint "contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230-34 (3d Cir. 2008) (analyzing Twombly). In so doing, I must accept all factual allegations, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. Although a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 1965 (internal citations omitted). In short:
"stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" the required element. This "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage," but instead "simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable ...