IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
March 6, 2009
DARREN KEITH ASKEW PLAINTIFF
LEHIGH COUNTY PRISON MAINTENANCE DIVISION, ET AL. DEFENDANTS
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Golden, J.
Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 16.) For the following reasons,*fn1 the Court will GRANT the Motion.
The Plaintiff Darren Keith Askew ("Askew") is suing the Lehigh County Prison Maintenance Division ("Maintenance"), Corrections Officer Troy Wright ("Wright"), and Lieutenant Robert Reighns ("Reighns"). (Compl., Doc. No. 7, ¶ II.b.) The alleged actionable conduct occurred in the Lehigh County Prison, (id. at ¶ II.a.), sometime before March 13, 2008 (id. at ¶ IV.b.).*fn2 Askew alleges that Wright "was aware of the water leakage" in Askew's cell and "didn't tell his Sergeant [Sergeant Fencemaker [sic]] that [Askew] was requesting to go to another cell." (Id. at ¶ V.1.) The water leakage "resulted in [Askew] slipping and falling." (Id.) Askew further alleges that Maintenance should have "fixed the problem" that caused the leak. (Id. V.2.) Lastly, Askew alleges that Reighns knew about the leak for two months and even told Maintenance about the leak, but he failed to follow up. (Id. V.3.)
Askew seeks the following relief: "For Officer TroyWright/ and Maintenance Department to be found incompetent and negligent. Secondly, I want to be granted proper medical care to find what is damaged, I still have to use crutches. Last, I want full compensation for my slipping and falling and pain and suffering that I still go through." (Id. VI.)
Maintenance, Wright, and Reighns (the "Defendants") move that the Court dismiss Askew's pro se Complaint with prejudice for its failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
When construing pro se complaints, the Court has a duty to do so liberally. See Bush v. City of Philadelphia, 367 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725 (E.D. Pa. 2005). However, a pro se complaint "must nevertheless set forth facts which, taken as true, state a claim as a matter of law." Barclay v. Amtrak, 435 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2006). In order to state claim for relief, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell v. Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (May 21, 2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965. "[A] complaint . . . must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 1969. In other words, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must have "nudged his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Id. at 1974.
Liberally construed, Askew has alleged three causes of action. The first sounds in tort and is based on allegations that Wright and Maintenance either negligently fixed or failed to fix the leak that caused Askew to fall in his cell. The second and third allege violations of the Eighth Amendment, which are actionable through Section 1983.*fn3 The alleged Eighth Amendment violations arise out of the conditions of Askew's confinement in the Lehigh County Prison and his allegations of improper medical care.*fn4
I. Federal Claims
A. Conditions of Confinement
"[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment "imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
A prisoner asserting a conditions of confinement claim must allege (1) that "he has suffered an objectively, sufficiently serious injury," and (2) "that prison officials inflicted the injury with deliberate indifference." Id., at 834. The first prong of the Farmer test is an objective one. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. See id.; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (holding that the Eighth Amendment required a remedy where inmates were crowded into cells with other inmates having infectious hepatitis and venereal disease). The second prong of the Farmer test is a subjective one, requiring the plaintiff to plead that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. To establish deliberate indifference, a prison official must (1) know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety, (2) be aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and (3) draw that inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Here, even giving Askew the benefit of the liberal pleading standards that he is entitled to, he has not sufficiently pleaded a constitutional violation. He alleges that he slipped and fell in his cell due to water that was accumulating there from leaky pipes. He further alleges that prison officials knew about the condition and either failed to act or acted negligently in repairing the leak. However, slippery floors, even if they cause inmates to fall and injure themselves, do not give rise to constitutional violations. See Atkins v. Sheriff's Jail Avoyelles Parish, 278 Fed. App'x 438, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff/inmate's conditions of confinement claim as frivolous where plaintiff/inmate alleged that "prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety when they failed to repair leaks that caused water puddles, which in turn caused [plaintiff/inmate] to slip and fall"); Mathis v. Ratelle, 166 F.3d 1218, *1 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that no constitutional violation occurred where prison officials failed to repair a crack in prison ceiling, even after plaintiff/inmate's cell was flooded) (table); Ellis v. Garcia, 159 F.3d 1357, *1 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no constitutional violation where plaintiff/prisoner was housed in a cell with a plumbing leak) (summary calendar); Jackson v. Taylor, No. 05-823, 2008 WL 4471439, *5 (D. Del. Sept. 26, 2008) (holding that "excessive humidity in the kitchen [, which] caused inmates to routinely slip and fall on the 'old side' floor does not constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation under the Eighth Amendment); Elvy v. Kearney, No. 02-362, 2005 WL 1026718, *4 (D. Del. Apr. 5, 2005) (granting motion to dismiss on conditions of confinement claim when plaintiff/inmate fell down a set of stairs due to the accumulation of water at the top of an interior stairwell after a heavy rainfall); Santiago v. Guarini, No. 03-475, 2004 WL 2137822, *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2004) (granting motion to dismiss on conditions of confinement claim and stating that "[s]lippery prison floors are not objectively serious conditions giving rise to Eighth Amendment violations"); Thomas v. Zinkel, 155 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (granting motion to dismiss conditions of confinement claim over allegations that prison officials knew of water leaks that caused plaintiff/inmate to slip and fall); Robinson v. Cuyler, 511 F. Supp. 161, 163 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("A slippery kitchen floor does not inflict cruel and unusual punishment," even where it causes the plaintiff/inmate to fall and burn himself with an overturned pot.). In other words, Askew has failed to plead "an objectively, sufficiently serious injury" for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the conditions of confinement claim must be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Medical Care
A Section 1983 complaint alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment based on improper medical care must contain more than allegations of medical malpractice. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Further, "'mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment' is also insufficient." Id. Rather, a plaintiff must allege either "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" or "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
Here, Askew is seeking "proper medical care to see what is damaged." The Court has inferred from this statement, which appears in Askew's Prayer for Relief, that Askew is attempting to establish an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care. However, Askew has neither named the defendants responsible for his medial care nor described the course of his treatment. Further, other than his statement that he still uses his crutches, Askew has not pleaded what his medical needs are. Without such allegations, it is impossible for the Court to determine whether Askew can allege enough facts to survive a motion to dismiss under the Eighth Amendment analysis for medical care as set forth in Estelle. Thus, the Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice and grant Askew leave to amend his complaint to plead an Eighth Amendment claim for medical treatment, if appropriate.
II. State Claim
When all federal claims have been dismissed in an action where jurisdiction is based on a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Having dismissed all of the federal claims in this case, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. Thus, the state law claim is dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate Order will follow.