IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
February 18, 2009
DARYL E. JOHNSON, PETITIONER
T.R. SNEIZEK, EDWARD REILLY, AND CHAIRMAN, U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS
The opinion of the court was delivered by: (Judge Conner)
AND NOW, this 18th day of February, 2009, upon consideration of the report of the magistrate judge (Doc. 11), to which no objections were filed, recommending dismissal of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (Doc. 1), and, following an independent review of the record, it appearing that petitioner violated the conditions of his parole on numerous occasions (see Doc. 11 at 2-3),*fn1 and that petitioner contends that revocation of his "good time" or "street time" credit, which he accumulated during his release on parole, violates his due process rights and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment (Doc. 1 at 3-4),*fn2 and the court finding that petitioner accepted the United States Parole Commission's offer of an expedited revocation procedure (Doc. 6, Ex. 1 at 20-21), that he waived his right to have time spent on parole credited to his sentence (id. at 20), and that he waived his right to appeal a parole revocation decision (id. at 21), the sum total of which leads the court to conclude that petitioner was afforded adequate procedural due process, see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979) (finding that due process is satisfied when an opportunity to be heard is allotted and a statement of reasons provided), and it further appearing that petitioner has a substantive due process liberty interest in his "street time" credit, see Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that inmates possess a liberty interest in good time credit); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974) (same), but that in the instant matter, the government's revocation of petitioner's "street time" does not "shock the conscience," see Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 2007) ("[T]he threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience."), and that the revocation was reasonably related to the government's legitimate interest in regulating criminal behavior, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972) ("Given the previous conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions of his parole."), and the court further concluding that the Commission's revocation of petitioner's "street time" does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, see Campbell, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 26 ("[T]he attachment of a condition that a violation of parole would result in loss of credit towards the completion of [petitioner's] sentence does not violate Eight Amendment standards."), it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The report and recommendation of the magistrate judge (Doc. 11) is ADOPTED.
2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
3. The Clerk of Court is instructed to CLOSE this case.
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER United States District Judge