The opinion of the court was delivered by: Donetta W. Ambrose Chief Judge, U.S. District Court
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
In this civil action, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, claims that Defendants, which are telephone service providers and credit agencies, have reported or pertpetuated inaccurate information relating to Plaintiff's credit history. He asserts claims based on the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C.§ 1681 et seq., the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), 73 P.S. § 201.1 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, as well as common law claims for defamation, tortious interference with business relations, tortious interference with contractual relations, infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, retaliation, and invasion of privacy/false light.
Before the Court are Motions to Dismiss the Complaint filed by Defendant AT & T Corporation ("AT & T"), and Defendant Verizon Pennsylvania, Inc. ("Verizon").
Both Motions are made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).*fn1
For the following reasons, the Motions are granted in part, and denied in part.
I. Pertinent Factual Allegations
As regards Defendants AT & T and Verizon in particular, Plaintiff avers that he has disputed inaccurate information concerning his accounts with these Defendants, and that without appropriate investigation of the disputes, Defendants have willfully continued to report the inaccurate information to various credit reporting agencies, failed to mark the accounts disputed, and continued to attempt to collect money from Plaintiff.
Plaintiff further avers that in the early 1970s, he was the president of a company that contracted with "companies affiliated with the AT & T/Bell system" to provide them with warehousing. Plaintiff alleges that he discovered an illegal scheme to inflate utility rates and perpetuate a monopoly. He reported the illegal activities to government agencies. Ultimately, his company sued the "Bell affiliates," which suit settled in 1981; the settlement unraveled, and Plaintiff began to personally sue the AT & T/Bell system, resulting in a "Bell counter-attack," one manifestation of which is AT & T's "campaign" fueled by false credit information. By incorporation, Plaintiff asserts identical factual allegations against Verizon.
Against these Defendants, Plaintiff raises claims for defamation, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, retaliation, and invasion of privacy/false light.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, all factual allegations, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F. 2d 66, 666 (3d Cir. 1988). In ruling a motion for failure to state a claim, I must look to "whether sufficient facts are pleaded to determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide the defendants with adequate notice to frame an answer." Id. at 666. Complaints "need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory." Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F. 3d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 2001). In addition, however, the court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Hunt v. United States Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2008).
It is insufficient "to allege mere elements of a cause of action; instead 'a complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.'" Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, U.S., 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1969 n.8, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "Put another way,...Rule 8(a)(2) requires a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant ...