AND NOW, this 3rd day of February, 2009, upon consideration of the report of the magistrate judge (Doc. 23), to which no objections were filed, recommending that defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 13) be granted, and, following an independent review of the record, it appearing that defendants did not violate plaintiff's procedural due process rights because Cumberland County Children and Youth Services ("CCCYS") attempted to notify plaintiff of the October 13, 2005 child dependency hearing via means that a reasonable person "desirous of actually informing" plaintiff thereof would have employed, Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006) ("[W]hen notice is a person's due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.") (quoting Mullane v. Cen. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)), and that plaintiff has not identified a CCCYS policy or custom of denying notice to a non-custodial parent or conducting an inadequate search for a non-custodial parent prior to a dependency hearing, see Jiminze v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)),*fn1 and the court concluding that plaintiff failed to establish a violation of his substantive due process rights because defendants' attempts to locate plaintiff by calling two telephone numbers listed under plaintiff's name in a local telephone directory and on the internet and by mailing a letter to plaintiff's last known address,*fn2 do not "shock the contemporary conscience" as egregious and outrageous behavior,*fn3 Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that in evaluating a due process challenge to executive action "the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience."),*fn4 it is hereby ORDERED that: