Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Tucker v. Mann Bracken

January 21, 2009

BURTON F. TUCKER & IDA TUCKER, PLAINTIFFS
v.
MANN BRACKEN, LLC, DEFENDANT



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiffs Burton F. Tucker and Ida Tucker filed a pro se complaint alleging that Defendant Mann Bracken, LLC violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. ("FDCPA"). Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, on the grounds that Plaintiffs' claims are time barred. Because the court finds that Plaintiffs' complaint was filed within one year of the most recent alleged FDCPA violation and Plaintiffs have alleged a continuing violation, Defendant's motion to dismiss will be denied.

I. Background

The court sets forth the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint and accepts them as true. Plaintiff Burton F. Tucker incurred debt on a credit card issued to him by MBNA America Bank, N.A. ("MBNA"). (Compl. ¶ 8.) MBNA retained Defendant Mann Bracken, LLC*fn1 who then filed a complaint against Burton Tucker on July 28, 2006 to collect that debt.*fn2 (Id.) By that point, the debt totaled more than $95,243.00, including interest and attorney's fees. (Id. ¶ 10.) Prior to filing the collection lawsuit, Defendant attempted to collect the debt by making telephone calls to Plaintiffs' home on their personal and business lines as early as January 14, 2005. (Id. Ex. 4.) Documents attached to Plaintiffs' complaint indicate that the telephone calls continued until March 14, 2008. (Id.) Plaintiffs characterize these telephone communications as harassing. (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14, 16, 21, 23.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant on September 10, 2008, alleging violations of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, 1692d, and 1692k. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs' complaint seeks $54,000.00 in damages for the harassing telephone calls. (Id. ¶ 24.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on October 8, 2008, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims are time barred under the FDCPA. (Doc. 6.) The parties have briefed the issues and the matter is now ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Among other requirements, a sound complaint must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). "Fair notice" in Rule 8(a)(2) "depends on the type of case-some complaints will require at least some factual allegations to make out a showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). "A situation may arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8." Id. A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.at 1965; accord Phillips, 515 F.3d at 238--39; Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (The court is not "compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." (quotations and citations omitted)); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350(3d Cir. 2005).

A defendant may attack a complaint by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all of the factual allegations in the complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and all reasonable inferences permitted by the factual allegations, Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2007), viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007). If the facts alleged are sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" such that the plaintiff's claim is "plausible on its face," a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1974; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234; Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007); Stevenson v. Caroll, 495 F.3d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 2007). This requirement "calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.

The "Third Circuit Rule" permits a limitations defense to be raised by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), but only if "the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations." Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hanna v. U.S. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 514 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1975).

III. Discussion

Defendant challenges the timeliness of Plaintiffs' complaint. Section 1692k(d) of the FDCPA provides that an "action to enforce any liability created by [the FDCPA] may be brought . . . within one year from the date on which the violation occurs." The dispute between the parties is when the alleged FDCPA violation occurred. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' FDCPA claim accrued when the first telephone call was received by the Plaintiffs in 2005, and Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they filed their action more than a year after the first call.

FDCPA has a one year initiation period. While there are no cases in this circuit addressing this issue, courts in other circuits have barred FDCPA claims arising from discrete acts occurring outside the one year limitations period. See, e.g., Sierra v. Foster & Garbus, 48 F. Supp. 2d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (holding that the continuing violations doctrine did not apply to two separate events and holding that FDCPA claim arising from an event beyond the limitations period was time barred); Pittman v J.J. MacIntyre Co., 969 F. Supp. 609, 611 (D.Nev. 1997) (allowing claims for telephone calls made within the one year period but barring claims for telephone calls made beyond that period); Pagan v. Monterrey Collection Servs., No. 07-80, 2007 WL 966009, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007) (barring FDCPA claims arising from telephone calls made beyond the one year limitations period). The above cases adopt the discrete acts as dispositive of the limitations period.

However, other courts considering FDCPA claims stemming from a pattern of repeated conduct have held that the entire pattern may be considered a continuing violation. See, e.g., Joseph v. J.J. MacIntyre Co., LLC, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (N.D. Ca. 2003) (applying the continuing violation doctrine where plaintiff alleged over 200 telephone calls spanning a nineteen month period); Padilla v. Payco General American Credits, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the one year limitations period "is not intended to deprive plaintiffs of the use of evidence of violations that took place more than a year before filing, but rather to protect defendants by ensuring that the action is filed within one year of the most recent date on which the defendant is alleged to have violated the [FDCPA]."); Sierra, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 395 (indicating in dicta that "a series of threatening letters, each of which violate the FDCPA and only some of which are time-barred" might be considered a continuing violation).

There are no cases in the Third Circuit considering whether the continuing violations theory may be applied to FDCPA claims. However, the Third Circuit has held that, "[t]he application of the continuing violations theory may be appropriate in cases in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct was part of a practice or pattern of conduct in which he engaged both without and within the limitations period." McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Joseph, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 1160--61 (adopting the continuing violations doctrine in FDCPA claims and explaining that the doctrine is properly applied in other remedial actions such as hostile work environment claims, Title VII claims, and anti-discrimination claims). The court acknowledges that mechanical application of the ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.