The opinion of the court was delivered by: Sylvia H. Rambo United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Annette and Steve Schaffhauser filed suit against Defendant Burton Neil & Associates, P.C. ("Firm"), and its employees, Defendants Burton Neil, Esq., Yale D. Weinstein, Esq., Edward J. O'Brien, Esq., and Jay H. Pressman, Esq. Plaintiffs allege violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"); the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act ("RICO"), and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act ("FCEUA"), Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), and common law mail fraud. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts. Because the court finds that Plaintiffs' complaint was filed after the statute of limitations for their claims under the FDCPA had terminated, summary judgment will be granted for Defendants on that issue. Defendants will be granted summary judgment on the RICO claim because Plaintiffs failed to show any evidence in support thereof. Judgment being appropriate on the issues providing this court with original jurisdiction, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims and those claims will be dismissed without discussion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The following undisputed*fn1 facts are the only facts of record pertinent to disposition of this motion for summary judgment. In 1998, Ms. Schaffhauser applied for and received a credit card with Citibank (South Dakota) N.A. ("Citibank"). In 1999, Mr. Schaffhauser applied for and received a credit card with Citibank. Both Plaintiffs charged purchases to their respective cards, but did not pay the balances. On January 24, 2001, Neil sent a letter to Mr. Schaffhauser in an attempt to collect the debt accrued on his Citibank credit card. On June 4, 2001 and August 24, 2001, Neil sent letters to Mr. Schaffhauser with settlement offers. The offer bore no fruit, thus on August 27, 2001, Neil filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, on behalf of Citibank and against Mr. Schaffhauser for the debt he owed. On June 26, 2007, judgment was entered against Mr. Schaffhauser.
On January 31, 2001, Neil sent a letter to Ms. Schaffhauser in an attempt to collect the debt she owed to Citibank. On March 19, 2001, Defendant Neil filed a lawsuit in the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, on behalf of Citibank and against Ms. Schaffhauser for the debt she owed. On October 9, 2007, judgment was entered against Ms. Schaffhauser.
Defendants Ed O'Brien and Yale Weinstein, also attorneys with the Firm, participated in the course of correspondence and litigation of Citibank's claims against the Schaffhausers. Defendant Jay Pressman, another attorney with the Firm, did not play a role in the Schaffhauser cases.
Ms. Schaffhauser filed a civil action in this court on October 12, 2005 (Doc. 1.) Mr. Schaffhauser filed a separate civil suit on October 31, 2005 (Doc. 1, No. 1:05-CV-2203.) On February 17, 2006, this court granted Defendants' motion to consolidate her case with Mr. Schaffhauser's. (Doc. 16.) Plaintiffs filed a joint amended complaint against all Defendants on November 29, 2006. (Doc. 69.) Defendants filed a timely answer. (Doc. 72.) After discovery, various motions for sanctions, and reassignment of this case to the undersigned, Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 14, 2008, with an appropriate statement of material facts and supporting brief. (Docs. 123-25.) Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motion and a counterstatement of material facts on February 11, 2008. (Docs. 132-33.) Defendants filed their reply brief on February 25, 2008 (Doc. 135), thus this motion is ripe for disposition.
II. Legal Standard -- Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); accord Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2001). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. The court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact in favor of the non-moving party. Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232.
Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the claims of the non-moving party, the non-moving party may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Instead, it must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted). Summary judgment should be granted where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "'Such affirmative evidence -- regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial ...