The opinion of the court was delivered by: Donetta W. Ambrose, Chief U. S. District Judge
OPINION and ORDER OF COURT
Plaintiff sued her employer for disability and age discrimination as well as for intentional infliction of emotional distress following her termination of employment. The employer and individual defendants seek dismissal of the disability claim on the basis of failure to exhaust administrative remedies; of the disability and age claims against the individual defendants on the basis that those statutes do not allow for the imposition of individual liability; and of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for myriad reasons. While I agree that individual liability is inappropriate under the ADA and the ADEA, and that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is fatally flawed, I find that resolution of the exhaustion argument premature.
Plaintiff Joann Spangler ("Spangler") worked at Defendant Moderne Glass Company, Inc. ("Moderne") for approximately six years before being terminated in what she describes as a pretextual layoff. The layoff occurred two years after Spangler was rendered unconscious following an aneurysm. Though Spangler returned to work following the aneurysm, she claims that Moderne placed her in a different position because it believed her to be disabled. Consequently, she asserts claims for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. and of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Moderne, its owner and CEO Thomas McKnight, its plant manager John Bailey and its department head Jim Devine.
The Defendants have filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss. See Docket No. 14. Believing that Spangler failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the ADA claim, the Defendants seek the dismissal of that claim. The Individual Defendants also seek the dismissal of the ADA and the ADEA claims on the independent grounds that those statutes do not allow for individual liability. Finally, all Defendants seek the dismissal of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. After careful consideration, and for the reasons set forth below, I find that the Motion is premature with respect to the dismissal of the ADA claim against Moderne, but that the ADEA and ADA claims asserted against the Individual Defendants should be dismissed, as should the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In deciding a Motion to Dismiss, all factual allegations, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be accepted as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1988). I may dismiss a complaint only if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957). In ruling on a motion for failure to state a claim, I must look to "whether sufficient facts are pleaded to determine that the complaint is not frivolous, and to provide the defendants with adequate notice to frame an answer." Colburn, 838 F.2d at 666.
While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept legal or unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27 n.2 (1977). Moreover, the plaintiff must set forth sufficient information to outline the elements of his claims or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(2)(a) and Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Matters outside the pleadings should not be considered. This includes "any written or oral evidence in support of or opposition to the pleadings that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in the pleadings." Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1366 (West 1990).
I. Count I - The ADA Claim
Failure to Exhaust There appears to be no dispute that the formal charge Spangler filed with the EEOC referenced discrimination on the basis of both "sex" and "age," but not "disability." See Docket No. 15-2. This failure is not, however, fatal to her claim. Instead, to determine whether Spangler exhausted her administrative remedies, and consequently whether I have jurisdiction to entertain her ADA claim, I must determine "whether the acts alleged in the subsequent ... suit are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation arising therefrom." Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984). In other words, I must determine whether her claim of disability discrimination is fairly within the scope of her claims of sex and age discrimination.
At a motion to dismiss stage, this assessment must be made in light of whether Spangler could prove any set of facts which would entitle her to relief. Bearing this standard in mind, I find that dismissal is unwarranted. I do not have the EEOC investigatory file before me. I cannot determine precisely what the EEOC investigated as a result of Spangler's filing. I can see that in issuing its Right to Sue Notice, the EEOC referenced the "Americans With Disabilities Act." See Exhibit A to Complaint. This would suggest to me that, as Spangler argues, her complaint of disability discrimination was fairly within the scope of the EEOC investigation. I notice as well that Spangler tendered to the EEOC a specific ADA intake questionnaire in which she specifically alleged disability discrimination. See Docket No. 15-2. Again, this could suggest that the EEOC investigation encompassed Spangler's complaints of disability discrimination.
Accordingly, I will deny the Motion to Dismiss Spangler's ADA claim. Following the conclusion of discovery, the Defendants may again raise the exhaustion argument. At that time, the record of what the EEOC investigation actually encompassed will be available for my review and I will better be able to assess whether Spangler's ADA claim was fairly within the scope of the EEOC complaint. Thus, the Motion to ...